Plaintiffs’ Judiciary Law Section 487 cause of action was properly dismissed.

In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim against an attorney for violating Judiciary Law Section 487, the New York State Court of Appeals held:

Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs (see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 763 [2016]), defendants established prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the Judiciary Law Section 487 (1) claim by demonstrating that plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants engaged in deceit or collusion during the course of the underlying federal intellectual property lawsuit against GM and EMI [FN2]. In response, plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden to establish material, triable issues of fact (id.). The affidavits plaintiffs submitted in opposition to summary judgment did not allege that defendants committed any acts of deceit or collusion during the pendency of the underlying federal lawsuit. To the extent defendants were alleged to have made deceitful statements, plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants induced them to file a meritless lawsuit based on misleading legal advice preceding commencement of the lawsuit is not meaningfully distinguishable from the conduct we deemed insufficient to state a viable attorney deceit claim in Looff (97 NY at 482). The statute does not encompass the filing of a pleading or brief containing nonmeritorious legal arguments, as such statements cannot support a claim under the statute [FN3]. Similarly, even assuming it constituted deceit or collusion, defendants’ alleged months-long delay in informing plaintiffs that their federal lawsuit had been dismissed occurred after the litigation had ended and therefore falls outside the scope of Judiciary Law Section 487 (1). Thus, plaintiffs’ Judiciary Law Section 487 cause of action was properly dismissed.

Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C. 2020 NY Slip Op 02125 Decided on March 31, 2020 Court of Appeals DiFiore, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law Section 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on March 31, 2020
No. 19

[*1]Bill Birds, Inc. et al., Appellants,
v
Stein Law Firm, P.C. et al., Respondents.

R. A. Klass
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The meaning and coverage of a general release depends on the controversy being settled.

While a party may negotiate for a general release when settling a party’s claim, it does not necessarily mean that the release covered all matters which were not envisioned when the release was given. As stated in Gorunkati v Baker Sanders, LLC, 179 AD3d 904, 906 [2d Dept 2020]:

Generally, “a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release” (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 NY3d 269, 276 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, “ ‘[t]he meaning and coverage of a general release depends on the controversy being settled and upon the purpose for which the release was actually given . . . . A release may not be read to cover matters which the parties did not desire or intend to dispose of’ ” (Wechsler v Diamond Sugar Co., Inc., 29 AD3d 681, 682 [2006], quoting Lefrak SBN Assoc. v Kennedy Galleries, 203 AD2d 256, 257 [1994]; see Demaria v Brenhouse, 277 AD2d 344 [2000]). A defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that it has been released from any claims (see Burgos v New York Presbyt. Hosp., 155 AD3d 598, 600 [2017]).

R. A. Klass
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Scales of justice illustrating article about legal malpractice.

Statute of limitations tolled by reason of disability or insanity?

In Jemima O. v Schwartzapfel, P.C., 178 AD3d 474, 475 [1st Dept 2019], the court held that the statute of limitations for the client to bring a legal malpractice was not tolled. The court held:

Plaintiff’s argument that the statute of limitations was tolled by reason of disability or insanity pursuant to CPLR 208 was properly rejected by the motion court, without a hearing. Plaintiff failed to put forth any evidence that would support a finding of disability or insanity sufficient to show that plaintiff was unable to function in society (see Santo B. v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 51 AD3d 956, 958 [2d Dept 2008]). In particular, she did not submit any doctors’ affidavits or medical records documenting the severity of her condition (see Matter of Brigade v Olatoye, 167 AD3d 462 [1st Dept 2018]; Santana v Union Hosp. of Bronx, 300 AD2d 56 [1st Dept 2002]). Moreover, the record does not show that plaintiff was incapable of protecting her legal rights despite her mental health diagnosis (see Burgos v City of New York, 294 AD2d 177, 178 [1st Dept 2002]).

R. A. Klass
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Sanctions against attorneys for failing to notify the court that an appeal has been withdrawn

The Appellate Division made a decision regarding the request for sanctions against attorneys for failing to notify the court that an appeal has been withdrawn as moot. The court reminded counsel of the obligation to monitor the status of cases and keep the Appellate Division informed of developments in cases that may affect a pending appeal. In Guo-Bang Chen v Caesar and Napoli, P.C., 179 AD3d 46, 49-52 [2d Dept 2019], the court held:

This subdivision, by its plain language, imposes a continuing obligation on counsel to monitor the status of the case and to apprise the Appellate Division of certain developments that might affect a pending appeal (see 22 NYCRR 1250.2[c] ). Although, pursuant to this section, only one attorney needs to notify the Court of the relevant developments, all of the attorneys are independently responsible for ensuring that a timely notification actually takes place (see 22 NYCRR 1250.2[c] ). Where, as here, a timely notification is not given by any of the attorneys, they may each be held independently responsible and, absent a showing of good cause for the failure to ensure a timely notification, sanctioned for their respective conduct (see id.Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Smith, 176 A.D.3d 83, 108 N.Y.S.3d 193).

Here, the record demonstrates that the underlying action was settled on March 1, 2019, as confirmed in an email exchange between the Fixler firm, representing the appellants, and the Sim firm, representing the respondent. In one of those emails, an attorney from the Sim firm expressed his understanding that the Fixler firm would, among other things, withdraw the appeal pending in this Court. By email of March 5, 2019, to the Sim firm, an attorney with the Fixler firm stated that he would advise the appellants and their appellate counsel of the settlement and direct them to withdraw the appeal. However, the Fixler firm did not advise the appellants’ appellate counsel, the Mischel firm, of the settlement until March 26, 2019, at 4:55 p.m.

The Mischel firm, relying at the time exclusively upon its appellate printer for notification of the calendaring of the appeal, was unaware, on March 26, 2019, when notice of the settlement of the action was received, that the appeal had actually been calendared. The appellate printer concedes that, due to an error in entering information into its computerized court calendar tracking system, it failed to notify the Mischel firm that the appeal had been calendared. The appellate printer represents that this was the first time such an error had occurred in relation to the multitude of cases it has worked on with the Mischel firm since 1999. The Mischel firm likewise represents that this was the first time it had missed a calendar date in two decades of appellate practice.

Acting on the erroneous assumption that the appeal had not yet been calendared, the Mischel firm mailed a letter to this Court on Tuesday, April 2, 2019, advising this Court of the settlement and requesting withdrawal of the appeal. By letter dated April 9, 2019, this Court advised counsel that, because the appeal had already been on the calendar, a stipulation withdrawing the appeal and the approval of this Court would be required (see 22 NYCRR 670.2[a][3] ).

When counsel in the underlying action reached a settlement on March 1, 2019, the settlement triggered their mutual obligations to “immediately notify” this Court (22 NYCRR 1250.2[c] ). However, neither the Fixler firm nor the Sim firm ever notified this Court.

The Fixler firm, in its capacity as the appellants’ trial counsel during the pendency of this appeal, had a continuing obligation either to advise this Court directly of the settlement or to ensure that its clients’ appellate counsel, the Mischel firm, advised this Court of the settlement. It is undisputed that, on the very day of the settlement, the Sim firm expressed its understanding that the Fixler firm would take responsibility for securing the withdrawal of the appeal. Within a few days, the Fixler firm confirmed that it would notify its clients’ appellate counsel of the settlement. However, despite this representation, the Fixler firm did not notify the Mischel firm of the settlement until three weeks later.

The Fixler firm asserts that it filed a stipulation of discontinuance with the Supreme Court, on March 29, 2019, after the settlement funds had cleared, and that this Court was notified of the settlement within two business days thereafter. The Fixler firm’s contention that it could await the clearance of the settlement payment and the finalization of other paperwork before notifying this Court of the settlement is unavailing for several reasons.

We note that the Fixler firm committed in its March 5, 2019, email to notify the appellants’ appellate counsel without expressing an intent to delay notification for any period of time or for any reason. More important, 22 NYCRR 1250.2(c) of the statewide Practice Rules of the Appellate Division requires that this Court be notified “immediately” when there has been a settlement of the matter. One of the primary purposes of section 1250.2(c) is to protect the Appellate Courts from spending time reviewing and analyzing matters that have been rendered academic (see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Smith, 176 A.D.3d 83, 108 N.Y.S.3d 193). Delayed notification defeats that purpose; providing notification benefits the Court, the Bar, and the public generally by enabling the Court to suspend its review of an appeal that will become academic. There is no adverse impact to the parties and counsel on such an appeal as consideration of the appeal may be readily resumed should the settlement not be implemented.

Precisely in order to alert counsel that their obligation to give immediate notification of a settlement may not be postponed or delayed, this Court adopted its own local rule of practice which states that, for purposes of 22 NYCRR 1250.2(c), settlement includes “any oral or written agreement or understanding which may, once memorialized, render a determination of the cause unnecessary” (22 NYCRR 670.2[b] ). This local rule took effect March 4, 2019, and is thus applicable to the case at hand.

In this case, members of this Court were caused to devote hours of preparation and deliberation on an appeal which, unbeknown to them, had been settled nearly one month earlier. Had this Court been timely advised of the settlement in this case, it could have avoided wasting judicial resources on a settled case and could have redirected those resources to one of the many actual controversies that fill its docket. Since the Fixler firm had an independent obligation to give this Court notice of the settlement and assured the Sim Firm that, as between the attorneys, the Fixler firm would assume responsibility for notification, the imposition of sanctions upon the Fixler firm in the sum of $250 is warranted.

While the Sim firm had its own independent obligation to immediately notify this Court of the settlement, we conclude, under the circumstances, that the Sim firm reasonably relied upon the Fixler firm’s written commitment that the Fixler firm would discharge this obligation on behalf of all counsel. Also, while the Mischel firm did not notify this Court immediately of the settlement, it did act with sufficient promptness that, under the circumstances, renders the imposition of sanctions unwarranted. Accordingly, no sanctions are imposed as against the Sim firm and the Mischel firm.

R. A. Klass
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Brandeis Society hosts annual luncheon for Chanukah

Published in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle
December 18, 2019

by Rob Abruzzese

Men and women in business attire posing for photo. From left: Hon. Katherine Levine, Hon. Ellen Spodek, Richard Klass, Hon. Jeffrey Sunshine, Hon. Anne Swern, Hon. Miriam Cyrulnik, Doron Leiby, Jeffrey Miller and Hon. Esther Morgenstern. Photo by Rob Abruzzese.
From left: Hon. Katherine Levine, Hon. Ellen Spodek, Richard Klass, Hon. Jeffrey Sunshine, Hon. Anne Swern, Hon. Miriam Cyrulnik, Doron Leiby, Jeffrey Miller and Hon. Esther Morgenstern. Photo by Rob Abruzzese.

“The Brooklyn Brandeis Society held its annual Chanukah luncheon and membership party in Brooklyn Heights on Monday as members gathered together to share latkes and donuts while a pair of rabbis shared stories of their common history….

Two men in business attire, posing for photo. Todd Sandler, director of the Brooklyn Jewish National Fund, on left, and Richard Klass on the right. Photo by Rob Abruzzese.
Todd Sandler, director of the Brooklyn Jewish National Fund, on left, and Richard Klass on the right. Photo by Rob Abruzzese.

R. A. Klass
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