More than fifty years ago, a charitable woman executed her Last Will and Testament, bequeathing all of her assets to two Catholic charities in the event that her siblings did not survive her. The two Catholic charities named in the Will were the Columbus Hospital and St. Joseph Rest Home for the Aged, each to get 50% of her estate. Both of these institutions were founded or operated by Italian American Catholic Orders.
In March 2008, the woman passed away, leaving more than $3,000,000 worth of assets in her estate. Since her siblings predeceased her, the Will left everything to the two Catholic charities.
Demise of Columbus/Cabrini Hospital
Columbus Hospital was founded in 1892 and operated a hospital in Manhattan. It was opened by a mission of the Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus to address the needs of Italian immigrants. In 1973, Columbus Hospital and Italian Hospital merged to form Cabrini Medical Center. Cabrini Medical Center operated as a hospital on the same site as Columbus Hospital on East 19th Street until it filed for bankruptcy on July 9, 2009. Through the bankruptcy proceedings, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center purchased the buildings in which Cabrini Medical Center was formerly located.
Charitable mission of St. Joseph Rest Home for the Aged
Similarly to Cabrini, St. Joseph Rest Home for the Aged was founded by Nuns whose lives are committed, without compensation, solely to their charitable and religious convictions. Both charitable organizations — Cabrini and St. Joseph — were founded and operated by Nuns of Italian heritage. The Order of St. Joseph’s was founded in Rome by Italian Nuns and still has a mother house located in the Vatican. St. Joseph’s Rest Home for the Aged, which operates a licensed nursing home facility that accommodates forty women, was founded by the Catholic Sisters of The Order of St. Joseph’s and is located in Paterson, New Jersey.
Accounting proceeding
Because Columbus Hospital had ceased to exist, the executor of the deceased woman’s estate filed a judicial accounting with the Surrogate’s Court, requesting that the Surrogate give the 50% share originally meant for Cabrini Hospital to Memorial Sloan Kettering. The executor indicated that the bequest originally meant for Cabrini should be given to Memorial Sloan Kettering because the deceased had been treated there.
The Chairman of the Board of Directors of St. Joseph contacted Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, about objecting to the bequest to Memorial Sloan Kettering and, instead, requesting that the Surrogate pay the entire net estate to St. Joseph Rest Home for the Aged.
Cy Pres doctrine
There is a centuries’ old doctrine of cy pres (pronounced “sigh – pray”), which is a rule that when literal compliance with a Will or trust is impossible, the intention of a donor or testator should be carried out as nearly as possible. This is especially true when a bequest to a charity has “lapsed” as the result of the charity no longer existing to receive the bequest; then the Surrogate may designate another charity in its place.
In the seminal case of In re Brundrett’s Estate [1940], a percentage of the remainder of the estate was left to St. Mark’s Hospital, but the hospital was bankrupt in 1931 and ceased to operate as a hospital and perform the functions for which it was originally incorporated. The court held that the gift to the hospital was, therefore, ineffectual. The court then applied the doctrine of cy pres and paid over that charity’s portion to the other charitable ‘remaindermen’ named in the Will (the term ‘remaindermen’ refers to others who receive the residuary or balance of an estate).
Following the holding in In re Brundrett’s Estate, the court in In re Shelton’s Estate [1942] was faced with a similar issue as presented here. In that case, the decedent left moneys to a charitable institution located in Italy that was maintained by a New York religious corporation. After the death of the decedent, the New York religious corporation relinquished its maintenance of the Italian institution and discontinued all of its religious and charitable activities. Although its officers continued to function, it was a “charity in name only.” The court held that the discontinuance of the charitable and religious functions precluded authorization of payment of the legacy to the entity. However, the court recognized that the decedent had charitable intentions to provide a gift for religious purposes and invoked the doctrine of cy pres. In granting the legacy originally left to the Italian charity to the other charitable legatee, the court in In re Shelton’s Estate held: “By the application of that doctrine [cy pres] the surrogate holds that the legacy did not lapse and may be paid to The Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine in the City and Diocese of New York, the other charitable legatees named in the will and object of the generous bounty of the testatrix.”
After the objection to the judicial accounting by St. Joseph, with sufficient case law being presented in support of the request to pay the bequest of Cabrini Hospital over to St. Joseph, the executor agreed to pay 100% of the residuary estate to St. Joseph, roughly $3 million in total. The nursing home needs a new roof — now they’ll be able to afford it!
Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Credits:
Photo of Richard Klass by Robert Matson, copyr. Richard A. Klass, 2011. Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc. Image on page one: Salzgitter, Städtisches Altenheim, 1961, Maria retirement home in Tann, in a hospital room with a Dutch nun. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Germany license. Attribution: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F010160-0001 / Steiner, Egon / CC-BY-SA.
copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq. The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
In 2004, a guy went out for a night of drinkin’ on the town. On the way home, he stopped in to one last bar to drink. At the bar, in a very drunk condition, he hit on a woman. After leaving the bar to go home, he saw standing by a nearby building a woman who he thought was the same one as the one in the bar. When the guy saw the woman on the street, thinking it was the one he saw in the bar, he grabbed and touched her. Unfortunately, it turned out that she was not the same woman—and she pressed charges of assault.
Naturally, the woman claiming assault not only sought criminal charges but also brought a civil action to recover damages from the guy. She brought the law suit against him through her lawyer in 2004. The defendant failed to answer the complaint after being served; however, her lawyer did not ask the judge to enter a default against the guy until 2006 – two years later. In support of the request for the default judgment, the lawyer stated that the woman had left New York to return to her native country because she was emotionally distraught over the assault and did not return until 2006. The judge granted a default judgment for the woman’s pain and suffering for $1,000,000.
The relevant New York statute governing default judgments, CPLR 3215, provides that, when a defendant has failed to appear in an action, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him. However, the plaintiff is required to do so within one year after the default, as required by subsection (c) thereof:
Default not entered within one year: If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. A motion by the defendant under this subdivision does not constitute an appearance in the action.
According to the above subsection, the court should have dismissed the complaint as abandoned, based upon the woman’s failure to take proceedings for the entry of default within one year. Numerous cases have held that dismissal of the complaint is required when there has been a failure to take timely proceedings for entry of default. See,Saunders v. Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, Inc., 273 AD2d 294 (2d Dept. 2000); PM-OK Associates v. Britz, 256 AD2d 151 (1st Dept. 1998).
Plaintiff must show a justifiable excuse
The Second Department held, in Winkelman v. H&S Beer and Soda Discounts Inc., 91 AD2d 660 (1982), that, absent a justifiable excuse and a showing that the action is meritorious, the plaintiff’s failure to enter a default judgment against the defendant within one year of the latter’s default mandates dismissal of the action against defendant as abandoned. In the affirmation of the woman’s attorney, he stated:
“ That shortly after the Summons and Complaint was served, the Plaintiff, suffering from emotional stress and trauma based on the underlying assault and battery complained in this action, left the United States for her home country of Spain, as Defendant resided in the same neighborhood as Plaintiff, and Plaintiff, in fear of her safety and mental well-being, withdrew from the country. ”
In Herzbrun v. Levine, 23 AD2d 744 (1st Dept. 1965), the Court held that the plaintiff’s excuse that she was forced to move to West Germany shortly after the action was commenced was not sufficient cause to excuse the failure to comply with the provisions of CPLR 3215. In Sortino v. Fisher, 20 AD2d 25, 30 (1st Dept. 1963), the court stated that “[T[he duty of prosecuting …. (an) action rests upon the (person) who brings it, not the (party) who defends it.” In that case, the court stated that “there is an intimate relationship between the merit of an action and the fact that it has been neglected.” This is the reason why an affidavit is needed because it must be “as good as the kind of affidavit which could defeat a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no issue of fact.” As Justice Breitel wrote in the decision: “Given the delay, he has a double burden; to justify the delay and to lend credit to the proferred justification by establishing merit.” Further, “Even an action of great merit may be forfeited by prolonged delay. It is the right of a defendant to be free of a case which is not diligently prosecuted. For obvious reasons, it is very rare and quite perverse that an action of merit is not diligently prosecuted.”
Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, brought a motion, termed an “Order to Show Cause,” to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the action. The motion stated that the excuse of the plaintiff for not entering the default within one year (that the woman suffered from emotional stress) had absolutely nothing to do with the requirement that her attorney should have moved for the default within one year since he proceeded on the Verified (or sworn) Complaint of his client and did not need any further sworn affidavits from her to obtain the default judgment.
In response to the Order to Show Cause, the plaintiff capitulated and agreed to settle the ‘Million Dollar’ case for a mere $7,500 to avoid further litigation!
by Richard A. Klass, Esq. Your Court Street Lawyer
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq. The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
Typically, the sale of real estate involves the signing of a contract of sale between the owner of the real estate and the prospective buyer for a certain dollar amount. Each side is eager to close the transaction — the seller wants the money from the closing to purchase another property and the buyer wants to move into the house.
Sometimes, the seller/owner of the real estate attempts to delay or cancel the contract of sale for various reasons, including that another party has come along offering more money to purchase the property than the contract price. The buyer is put into a position of bringing an action to enforce his/her rights under the contract of sale to purchase the property.
The right of the prospective buyer to bring an action for “specific performance” is an important one, which is based upon an old, “common law” theory that real estate is considered a “unique asset,” for which a money judgment against the seller for breach of contract cannot recompense. The courts recognize that a certain piece of real estate cannot be replicated or replaced with another or with money.
The action to force the sale of real estate based upon a breach of contract starts with the filing of a Complaint with the Supreme Court in the county in which the property is located. At or about the same time, the buyer will file a “Notice of Pendency” with the County Clerk. The “Notice of Pendency” or, as commonly known as the “Lis Pendens,” is a document which serves as notice to the entire world that the buyer is laying an equitable claim to the ownership of the property and that an action is pending to determine the buyer’s potential ownership rights therein. Any person who later contracts to purchase the property is effectively “on notice” of the buyer’s claim and is taking substantial risk in proceeding in any transaction with the seller/owner of the real estate.
After the action is filed, the seller will have an opportunity to answer the Complaint. Then, typically, one of the parties will move for “summary judgment,” asking the judge to decide whether there was a breach of the contract of sale and whether the buyer is indeed entitled to the specific performance of the contract of sale. If the judge decides that the buyer is entitled to purchase the property, then the judge will issue an Order directing the seller/owner to proceed to closing and tender a Deed to the buyer.
It is important for the prospective buyer to move quickly to file the Notice of Pendency when it appears that a breach of the contract of sale has or will occur, in order to ensure that there is constructive notice of the action for specific performance; otherwise, the buyer, albeit entitled to money damages, will no longer have the right to the property.
by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
copyr. 2004 and 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq. The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to
with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
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About the Author: Richard A. Klass, Esq. maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
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