Seller has no duty to disclose: New York

Seller has no duty to disclose: New York law does not impose a duty on a seller of real property to disclose information concerning the property.  See, Renkas v. Sweers, 10 Misc.3d 1076(A), 814 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co), “Active concealment is some conduct, more than mere silence, by the seller that may create a duty to disclose information concerning the property (Gizzi at 881; Bethka v. Jensen, 250 A.D.2d 887,888 [3d Dept.1998] ). To recover damages for active concealment, “the plaintiff must show, in effect, that the seller or the seller’s agents thwarted the plaintiff’s efforts to fulfill his responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor” (Jablonski at 485).

Any potential fraud claim to be brought against a seller for failing to disclose a lawsuit involving the property and its circumstances would fail. Facts which are accessible as a matter of public record bar a claim of justifiable reliance necessary to sustain a cause of action for fraud. Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. v. Rohr Industries, Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 737 (2d Cir.1984); Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 603, 157 N.E.2d 597, 601 (1959); Most v. Monti, 91 A.D.2d 606, 456 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (2d Dept.1982).

To the extent that there may be “latent” defects in the building, a duty to disclose a latent defect concerning the premises may be based (post-closing and upon later discovery) on the theory that where a buyer is not able to discover the defect in question through ordinary inspection and would not be willing to purchase the property if he or she knew of it, then a contract that is procured without disclosing such a defect is procured by fraud and misrepresentation. See, Young v. Keith, 112 A.D.2d 625, 492 N.Y.S.2d 489 (3d Dep’t 1985); McMillen v. Marzacano, 277 A.D. 977, 100 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep’t 1950). These allegations would require a high burden of proof.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Doctrine of caveat emptor: New York law…

Doctrine of caveat emptor: New York law follows the long-standing tradition in the purchase of real property that a buyer has the duty to satisfy himself of the quality of the bargained-for purchase of the property without trying the seller. See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675–76 (1st Dept.1991); London v. Courduff, 141 A.D.2d 803, 529 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (1st Dept.). Further, the term to purchase the property “AS IS” is a specific contract disclaimer as to the condition of the property to be purchased and thwarts this breach of contract claim (see Mosca v. Kiner, 277 A.D.2d 937,939 [4th Dept.2000]; McManus v. Moise, 262 A.D.2d 370,371 [4th Dept.1999]).

Under the generally accepted doctrine in real estate transaction of caveat emptor or buyer beware, there is no duty upon the seller to disclose any information concerning the property (Caceci v. DiCanio Construction Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52,57 [1988]).

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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The Producer: overselling available interests

The Rehearsal Onstage (detail), c. 1874, by Edgar Degas (1834–1917) illustrating article by Richard Klass about overselling available interests.
The Rehearsal Onstage (detail), c. 1874, by Edgar Degas (1834–1917).

Mel Brooks’ movie and musical The Producers may have been a fictional story of fraudsters selling more shares in the production of their Broadway show “Springtime for Hitler” than actually existed, but such fraudsters exist in real life, overselling available interests not only in Broadway productions, but in every type of investment, including real estate.

In this modern day The Producers story, a particular real estate broker (we’ll give him the name “Bob”) had a plan. The idea behind this particular investment was simple: purchase a house in Passaic, New Jersey; fix it up; and then resell it for a profit—the classic real estate “ flip. ” This broker solicited a number of investors. Each investor would purchase a membership interest in a limited liability company [LLC]. With the funds provided by the members, the LLC would buy the house. A contractor-partner would be hired to renovate the house. Each investor was promised a certain percentage of the net proceeds from the ultimate sale of the house. Unfortunately, the real estate market tanked, construction costs soared and the investment became a huge loss before construction was ever completed.

New Jersey state court action

One of the investors (we’ll call him “John”) brought a lawsuit in the Superior Court in New Jersey for breach of contract, misappropriation of funds, and fraud. In that case, the judge appointed a special fiscal agent (similar to a court-appointed receiver) to manage the operations of the house, list the house for sale, and take all steps necessary to sell the house and distribute the net proceeds to the LLC’s investors.

Real estate broker files for bankruptcy

Bob filed for personal bankruptcy in the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court to avoid his liability to the investors. John filed a lawsuit (known as an adversary proceeding) against Bob in the New Jersey bankruptcy case to have Bob’s liability in this house-investment-gone-wrong declared “nondischargeable.” (The adversary proceeding here was a mini-lawsuit inside of the bankruptcy case, intended to have the effect that Bob would remain liable to John for the collapse of the real estate deal.) In the adversary proceeding, John alleged that Bob brought too many investors into the deal without telling the other investors. A settlement was reached between John and Bob in the “adversary proceeding” and John negotiated with the bankruptcy trustee to purchase the house directly from the trustee to recoup some of his (John’s) losses.

Another investor (we’ll call her “Sally”) who lost money in the same Passaic real estate deal then sued John (now the owner of the Passaic real estate) in New York City’s Civil Court, claiming that John defrauded Sally by not including her in the buy-out of the house. This is when John sought help from Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer. The aim was to have Sally’s lawsuit, brought in New York, dismissed.

Lack of jurisdiction in the New York Civil Court

There is a basic concept involving any court system that a particular court maintains the authority (“jurisdiction”) to make decisions and orders over a particular controversy.

According to New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 302, New York State courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents under certain circumstances, when the defendant:

  1. Transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or
  2. Commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
  3. Commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state.

There is a separate rule as to when New York City’s Civil Court may exercise jurisdiction over cases because it is considered a court of “limited” jurisdiction (See Civil Court Act Section 202).

In asking the judge to dismiss the New York Civil Court case, Richard A. Klass argued that any action that could be brought by Sally must be brought in the State of New Jersey, and not in New York. The project-house was located in New Jersey; the LLC was a New Jersey entity; both the New Jersey Superior Court and New Jersey Bankruptcy Court had pending cases involving the house and the LLC; and all of the events transpired in New Jersey. It was urged that New York was the wrong forum for Sally to bring this dispute, citing to Epstein v. Sirivejkul, 48 NY2d 728 [1979]; Irrigation and Industrial Development Corp. v. Indag S.A., 37 NY2d 522 [1975].

The Civil Court judge agreed with the arguments of Richard A. Klass and determined that the New York Civil Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The judge specifically found that the transaction in dispute occurred in New Jersey and the plaintiff presented no allegations that there was tortious conduct within New York State; also, the fact that there were existing proceedings in New Jersey courts confirmed the conclusion that New Jersey was the proper forum for any dispute. The court then dismissed the plaintiff’s case.

 
by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Surprise!

On a recent day, “Jack” (not his real name) went to an ATM to withdraw money from his bank account. To his surprise, he could not. Upon contacting the bank’s customer service department, he discovered that his bank account was restrained and could not be accessed. The bank’s representative informed him that there was a judgment against the joint accountholder—a friend, we’ll call him “Stan”—and this was the reason for the restraint on the account.

Jack remembered that many years ago, when he needed to travel to his home country for several months, he asked Stan if he could put Stan’s name on the bank account in case Jack needed someone to pay his bills while traveling. Ultimately, Stan never used the account—never wrote a check, never made a deposit, and never made any withdrawals. Unfortunately, years later, a creditor of Stan got a judgment against Stan and now, Jack, the primary account holder of the bank account, was paying the price.

Joint bank accounts and Banking Law Section 675

According to New York Banking Law Section 675, a joint bank account is presumed to belong to each of the accountholders—meaning that each person (and his judgment creditors) may access the full amount of the account. Specifically, this section of law provides that, except for fraud or undue influence, the making of deposits into a joint account is evidence that the depositor intended the account to be a joint tenancy. The burden of proving otherwise is upon the person who challenges title, which, in this case, would be the primary accountholder.

Once restrained, a creditor of one accountholder may be able to obtain half or all of the money in the joint account, according to differing court opinions. (One opinion, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Astoria Federal, 189 Misc.2d 475, holds the creditor is entitled to more than half of account, and another, Mendel v. Chervanyou, 147 Misc.2d 1056, holds that it is not). In any event, in this situation, Jack had the problem where all of the money in the account belonged solely to him and Stan never used the account.

“Convenience” bank accounts

Luckily, there is another concept that applied to this situation. The law recognizes that a bank account may be established as a quasi-joint account, where a person is added merely as a “convenience” to the primary accountholder. This convenience is typically done in situations where there is an elderly parent or disabled person who cannot easily travel to the bank to handle his banking needs.

The account may actually be set up in this exact form from its inception (Banking Law Section 678 authorizes this type of account), or it may operate as one where there is sufficient proof that adding the other name to the account was just for the convenience of the accountholder. Where the account is initially set up as a convenience account, the bank will indicate the same and any deposits will not be presumed to belong to each of the accountholders but just the primary one. Also, upon death of the primary accountholder, the other person will not have a right of survivorship in the account, but the moneys will pass to whomever the primary accountholder has designated in his Will or heirs at law. Where the account is not designated as a convenience account from the onset, Banking Law Section 675 will allow a party to rebut or disprove the general presumption that it was a true joint account—evidence may include the wording written in on the account application or signature card, sources of deposits, usage of the account, and the circumstances in which the account was set up.

Jack’s attorney searched the internet for “exempt property and accounts” for more information and found an article by Richard A. Klass on the subject of the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA).* After getting the run-around from the creditor’s attorney for almost three weeks, Jack decided to retain Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer.

Upon sending proof regarding the fact that the account belonged to the primary accountholder and that the debtor was on the account only for convenience purposes, along with a letter explaining the law and threatening to sue for attorney’s fees, the creditor’s attorney confirmed the next day that the account would be immediately released.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

* The article, entitled “Analysis of Exempt Income Protection Act,” may be found on the firm’s website.

copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Credits:
Photograph on page one: ATM in Santillana, 2008, by Handige Harrie. Artwork released by author into the public domain.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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529 Plans in Bankruptcy

Americans rely on easy credit in order to fund their lifestyles.  We are lured by good credit terms, the desire to buy a home, and the need to pay for things like education and home improvements.  We do our best to save for our future, putting money into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or 401Ks, money that is not to be used until retirement.  When we have children we consider their futures and the ever increasing costs of college, and we want to save for our children’s future education by opening Education IRAs or 529 Savings Plans.

In New York State, when someone obtains a money judgment against you, they have several remedies in order to obtain payment of the judgment, including garnishing your wages, putting a lien on bank accounts and other property held in your name.  This may include a 529 Savings Plan.  CPLR section 5205 provides several exemptions to protect debtors.  It lists several types of property that cannot be reached by creditors.  CPLR 5205(j) provides protection for New York 529 Savings Plans by exempting and thus protecting from creditors a New York State 529 Savings Plan in an amount not exceeding $10,000.   This is good news and bad news for debtors.  It protects smaller 529 plans from being plundered by a creditor, but if you’ve saved for many years, the 529 Savings Plan may exceed the $10,000 balance and is thus open season for a creditor looking for repayment of an outstanding debt.

Bankruptcy can offer better protection for a debtor who is trying to protect a 529 Savings Plan he has created for his children.  Bankruptcy Code 541(b)(6) provides that funds placed in an 529 Savings Plan 1 year or longer before the date the debtor files for bankruptcy is not property of the bankruptcy estate if the designated beneficiary is a child, stepchild, grandchild or step-grandchild, and the funds contributed do not exceed the total contributions permitted.  In addition, in order to ensure debtors have not transferred assets to exempt accounts in preparation of filing bankruptcy, any contributions made between year one and year two before filing are limited to a total contribution of $5,850. The exemption regarding an education IRA is similar in nature to the 529 Savings Plan, but include a requirement that the account could not be pledged to have credit extended to the debtor.  This language can be found in Bankruptcy Code 541(b)(5).

Therefore, for individuals who are contemplating bankruptcy but are concerned about 529 Savings Plans they have established for their children can now rest easy in the knowledge these accounts may be protected and may not be reached by creditors.

by Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq.,
Associate
Law Office of Richard A. Klass

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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