Amendment to Bankruptcy Petition Worth Millions!

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A brother tried to help his sister, and it almost cost him millions of dollars. Based upon the brother’s good credit, his sister bought a house in Queens in his name. At some point, she was unable to keep up with the mortgage payments and the house fell into foreclosure.

On the eve of the foreclosure sale, the brother filed bankruptcy to “stay” the sale. In the mad rush to save the family home (which, unfortunately, is common these days!), the brother did not understand something very important: the personal injury lawsuit he filed years earlier, relating to a construction work-site injury in which he was severely injured, was an “asset” of his to be listed in his bankruptcy petition. Unfortunately, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case was dismissed because the brother could not make the mortgage or bankruptcy plan payments. The house was later sold at foreclosure sale.

State Court Motion to Dismiss:

Subsequently, the defendants in the state court personal injury case asked the judge to dismiss the case based upon the failure of the plaintiff/injured person to list the pending lawsuit as a “contingent asset” in his bankruptcy petition. Substantial New York case law, going all the way up to the New York State Court of Appeals, has held that the failure to list the asset in the petition is fatal to the continuance of the personal injury case – every case on point says the injured person’s lawsuit gets dismissed without any recovery, no matter how grave the injury.

Uncharted Course to Be Taken:

Faced with this apparently insurmountable challenge, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, was brought in to help save the man’s personal injury case. The strategy developed was to return to the Bankruptcy Court to seek to amend or fix the petition to reflect the existence of the personal injury claim. This was trail-blazing!

In determining that the debtor/personal injury plaintiff should be permitted to amend his bankruptcy petition to list the claim as an asset, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Craig stated: “This Court has not found any statute, rule or precedent that provides that a debtor’s right to amend expires upon dismissal of the case, or that the order dismissing the case must be vacated before schedules, statements or lists may be amended.” In re Severius Raggie, New York Law Journal 7/9/2008.

Interplay between “Closed” and “Closed”:

At first glance, the court noted that the bankruptcy case was marked “closed.” The judge was skeptical that an amendment to the petition could be made because Bankruptcy Rule 1009 provides that “a voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed.”

However, in relying upon the decision in In re Critical Care Support Services, 236 BR 137, it was pointed out that a case can only be “closed” when the assets of the bankruptcy estate have been fully administered. The term “closed,” as used in Bankruptcy Rule 1009 and Bankruptcy Code §350, does not encompass “dismissed” cases. Thus, an Order dismissing a case accomplishes a completely different result than an Order closing it would; essentially, upon dismissal of a bankruptcy case, all of the debtor’s rights in his property revert back to him.

Separately, the court also held that, as part of accepting the debtor’s amendment, it could reject the amendment when “the facts and circumstances presented indicate that the amendment was filed in bad faith, fraudulent or prejudicial.” Citing to In re Nye, 250 BR 46. In this case, Judge Craig held that there was no evidence of bad faith, fraud or prejudice; the state court defendants’ argument that granting the amendment would “reward” the debtor was not persuasive. In the absence of any evidence that the debtor deliberately omitted the personal injury claim from his schedules to defraud his creditors, permitting the debtor to amend did not reward wrongdoing.

After Judge Craig granted the debtor’s motion to amend his bankruptcy petition, the state court defendants in the personal injury lawsuit withdrew their motion to dismiss the case. The plaintiff’s case is now winding through the New York State Supreme Court towards a trial, in which his serious injuries will be considered by a jury.

Richard A. Klass, Esq.

 

©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: Selbstporträt mit fünfzig Jahren, by Giovanni Fattori, 1884; Porträt der dritten Ehefrau, by Giovanni Fattori, 1905. Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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$73K Buys $200,000 House, Thanks to Debtor’s “Hat Trick” Screw-up.

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The foreclosure auction of the defendant’s Staten Island house came up on a Wednesday at 9:30AM. The courtroom was packed with people ready to bid on the house. The Referee announced the sale of the house, took bids, and struck down the sale at $73,000 to the successful bidder.

Moments later, the Referee informed the successful bidder that one of the two owners of the house had filed bankruptcy at 9:26AM; therefore, the foreclosure sale was invalid and the bidder should take back his bid deposit. At that moment, the successful bidder called Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer about whether the sale was indeed invalid.

Automatic Stay Operates as a “Stop” Sign:

People normally file for bankruptcy protection for one or both of two reasons: (1) to discharge debt; and (2) to “stay” (or stop) proceedings against the debtor, such as foreclosures, lawsuits, repossessions, evictions, etc.

Under Bankruptcy Code §362(a), the filing of a bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court imposes an automatic stay upon creditors from taking certain actions, including specifically auctioning off the debtor’s house (Note: there are exceptions which may apply). Generally, actions taken after the filing of the bankruptcy petition are null and void, as if they never occurred. In this particular situation, the foreclosure auction happened 4 minutes after the bankruptcy filing. Under normal circumstances, the automatic stay would have voided this sale and the successful bidder would have merely gotten back his bid deposit, without getting the house.

Before the drastic changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 (under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act [BAPCPA]), debtors would go in and out of bankruptcy to prevent their houses from being sold. Since BAPCPA, it has gotten more difficult for debtors to get the benefit of the “Stop” sign – the first filing will trigger a stay, the second filing a briefer stay, and the third filing no stay unless requested. These “Stop” signs begin to feel like a “Hat Trick,” where one player scores three times.

Searching for Details:

The first step in trying to salvage the foreclosure sale for the successful bidder was reviewing every document filed in the bankruptcy case. This included the “bare bones” petition and the “Credit Counseling Certificate.” This Certificate states that the debtor completed a credit counseling course within six months before the bankruptcy filing, which must be done in order to be eligible to file bankruptcy. Upon very close review, it appeared that the debtor simply took the old, expired Certificate from her prior bankruptcy case the year before (more than 6 months old) and filed the same one again – a big but little-noticed “no-no.”

Upon further digging, it appeared that the co-owner of the house had previously filed bankruptcy and there was an order terminating the stay a year earlier. Also, the debtor had both unsuccessfully filed a bankruptcy before and had filed the current one without complying with the rules, including paying the court’s filing fee.

Validation of Post-Petition Foreclosure Sale:

The Court found that grounds existed to warrant the annulment or termination of the automatic stay and validation of the foreclosure sale. Citing to several cases, the court identified various factors that should be considered in determining whether to validate a post-petition foreclosure sale, including whether:

  1. the creditor had actual or constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and, therefore, of the stay;
  2. the debtor has acted in bad faith;
  3. there is equity in the property of the estate;
  4. the property is necessary for an effective reorganization;
  5. grounds for relief from stay exist and a motion, if filed, would have been granted prior to the violation;
  6. failure to grant retroactive relief would cause unnecessary expense to the creditor;
  7. the creditor has detrimentally changed its position on the basis of the action taken;
  8. the creditor took some affirmative action post-petition to bring about the violation of the stay; and
  9. the creditor promptly seeks a retroactive lifting of the stay and approval of the action taken. In re Campbell, 356 BR 722 (WD Mo.2006); In re Williams, 257 BR 297 (Bankr.WD Mo. 2001).

Reviewing the facts of the particular situation, the Court found “ample support” for annulling the stay retroactively and validating the post-petition foreclosure sale. These facts included the bare bones petition filed by the debtor with the expired Certificate, her case being filed on the same date as the auction sale, her significant prior experience in bankruptcy, and the negative effect to the successful bidder’s (an independent third party) rights.

In granting the successful bidder’s motion, the Bankruptcy Judge determined that the “debtor’s failure to act in good faith in this case warrants the annulment of the automatic stay and the validation of the petition day foreclosure sale.” In re Annie Williams, US Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York, Case No. 1-09-44856-dem [Decision dated January 27, 2010]. Since the Bankruptcy Court validated the foreclosure sale, the successful bidder achieved his desired result – the purchase of the Staten Island house, valued at more than $200,000, for $73,000.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Credits:
Image by artist August Macke (1887-1914).
Photo of Richard Klass by Tom Urgo, 2008.
Law firm business communications services provided by
The Innovation Works, Inc.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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How the “ Continuous Representation ” Doctrine Helps Injured Clients.

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In legal matters, there is an attorney-client relationship from the moment that the attorney is consulted by the client until the matter concludes. If, during the term of this relationship, the attorney was negligent or commits malpractice in the matter, the client may have a claim against the attorney for legal malpractice. Sometimes, the malpractice is committed at the early stages of litigation and not at the conclusion; for instance, an action may have started in Year 1, malpractice was committed in Year 2, and the action concludes in Year 6. The question then becomes whether or not the client may pursue a claim against the attorney for the malpractice committed in Year 2, when the statute of limitations period may have already passed.

CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.

The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].

In order to protect clients The Court of Appeals has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra.

The Continuous Representation Toll

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

copyr. 2008 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Art credits: [art critic] Diego Martelli in Castiglioncello by Giovanni Fattori, 1865-1867.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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“Busting” the Trust!

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A Trust was created by a woman in her Last Will and Testament (testamentary trust), leaving her children and their issue (children) as the sole beneficiaries of the trust. The Children’s Trust was formed as a “mixed” discretionary trust; meaning that the trustees maintain the discretion to pay moneys to the beneficiaries of the trust but the trust itself is a spendthrift trust, whereby the beneficiaries cannot invade the trust or, in other words, take out money themselves. A “discretionary” trust is typically set up to give the trustees the authority to pay money (either principal or interest) as they see fit, considering the lifestyle and resources of the beneficiary. A “spendthrift” trust prohibits the beneficiary, creditors of the beneficiary, or any other person from taking money out of the trust.

The “deadbeat” parent

A couple was married and had two children. The husband was one of the children of the woman who set up the trust. They got divorced and the two children lived with the wife. As part of the Judgment of Divorce, the husband was ordered to pay child support and yeshiva tuition for the couple’s daughter. The husband failed to pay the court-ordered amounts. The judge granted money judgments against the husband to pay child support arrears, tuition and legal fees. Enforcement of the money judgments proved fruitless. The wife brought proceedings to punish the husband for contempt of court. The judge found that the husband was guilty of contempt of court and even granted an Order of Contempt, allowing for the husband’s arrest for not paying child support. The husband and his assets could not be located – the typical case of a “deadbeat parent.”

Unfortunately, the wife was, perhaps, more down and out than most people. She was ill and unable to work; not eligible for social security disability income; and living off of her adult son’s meager income and public assistance through food stamps. Her daughter was going to be expelled from school for nonpayment of three years’ worth of tuition. That’s when the wife’s divorce lawyer referred her to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for help.

Looking at invading the Children’s Trust

Generally, a trust can be made invincible – no one can gain access to the moneys or property contained in it, not even the beneficiary. The “settlor” (the one who sets up the trust and funds it) appoints a trustee who will carry out her wishes and follows the directions contained in the trust document.

In this particular trust, the beneficiaries were listed as “the Child and the Child’s issue.” Clearly, the Children’s Trust envisioned the trustees giving money not only to the “deadbeat parent” but also to his children, including the daughter who was about to be kicked out of school.

An Order to Show Cause was brought in New York State Supreme Court to (a) have the trustees pay the child support arrears and yeshiva tuition owed by the husband; (b) restrain the trustees from paying any money out of the trust to the “deadbeat” parent; and (c) sequester, or set aside, enough money from the trust to pay future child support until the daughter’s age of majority.

The guiding light of Judge Nathan Sobel

The issue of “busting” a trust set up by a grandparent for the benefit of a grandchild was brought up in a case over 40 years ago, in a case of first impression, before the beneficent Surrogate of Kings County, Judge Nathan Sobel. In Matter of Chusid, Judge Sobel first stated the general proposition that a testator may dispose of his own property as he pleases. Among other things, a testator may create a trust for the benefit of an infant or improvident person, so that the beneficiary does not squander the money. However, Surrogate Sobel stated the oft-cited principle which applied to this situation (and, unfortunately, to so many others): “No man should be permitted to live at the same time in luxury and in debt.”

While recognizing that the general purpose of a discretionary trust is to protect the trustee from unreasonable demands of a beneficiary or from creditors’ claims, it does not insulate or protect the trustee from responsibility to and reasonable directions from a court. Further, as stated in the Chusid opinion, this “is particularly true where the income beneficiaries are dependent children who will either starve or become public charges if the trustees refuse to exercise discretion in their favor.” Judge Sobel then held that the trustee’s discretion yields to and is subordinate to the equity powers of the court to direct payment for the support of minor dependent children.

After argument of the Order to Show Cause, with the opposition of the trustees of the Children’s Trust, the judge made the determination that the wife was entitled to “bust” the trust open to have the trustees pay the child support arrears and yeshiva tuition owed by the husband from the principal and interest of the trust. The judge ordered the trustees of the Children’s Trust to pay the following amounts: (a) 82,350 for yeshiva tuition; (b) 43,329 for child support arrears; and (c) $3,960 for school transportation expenses; he also ordered the trustees to sequester $53,891 for future child support payments.

Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Art credits: Leute am blauen See, by August Macke (1887-1914).

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Notice to Admit: The Power of a Piece of Paper

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In the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) – the “Game Book” of civil practice in New York State courts, there is a little-used device called the “Notice to Admit.” While not as often utilized by attorneys as it ought to be, it can pack a powerful punch to the other side in litigation.

As most of us know, the old days of Perry Mason pulling out a trick at trial have greatly diminished due to the introduction into the legal process of a phase in the litigation known as “discovery.” During the discovery phase, each adversary is permitted to inspect and “discover” relevant documents and information pertaining to the lawsuit, through the use of various discovery techniques. Those discovery techniques may include, among other things, inspecting the books and records of a business, asking questions known as “interrogatories,” performing a physical examination, viewing photographs or videos made of the scene of an incident, and inspecting the geographic location of an area which is the subject of the litigation. Among those discovery techniques, there is the Notice to Admit.

CPLR Section 3123 provides that: “a party may serve upon any other party a written request for admission by the latter of the genuineness of any papers or documents, or the correctness or fairness of representation of any photographs, described in and served with the request, or of the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry.” It is further provided that, if the latter party fails to respond, the effect is that the matter shall be deemed “admitted.”

In Rodriguez v. Moreno, it was alleged that, in 1994, the owner of a 2-family house in Brooklyn had to leave this country in a hurry and needed cash. He made an agreement with his tenant that, in exchange for $30,000 cash and the continued payment of the mortgage on the house, the tenant could effectively purchase the house from him. To memorialize their understanding, the owner and his tenant went to the owner’s attorney to sign documents.

The owner’s attorney drafted the documents necessary to transfer title to the house, including a Deed. The owner signed the documents, and the attorney held onto the originals. The agreement was, once the tenant paid off the last of the mortgage payments on the house, the Deed would be released to him from the attorney’s escrow. This arrangement continued for 13 years.

In 2007, the tenant discovered that the owner, who still held title to the house, was trying to sell it to someone else. The only proof of the agreement he had was a photocopy of the front side of the Deed that the owner signed 13 years earlier. Unfortunately, the owner’s attorney had been disbarred years earlier and was nowhere to be found; also gone were the original documents.

Quick Action Was Needed

Armed with only a skimpy photocopy of the first page of the Deed, which had the signature of the owner, the tenant hired Richard A. Klass, Esq., to bring an action under New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) to enforce his rights to the house. Since the owner was actively trying to sell the house, and had signed a contract to sell the house to someone else, quick action to stop the sale was needed. With the filing of the Summons and Complaint, a Notice of Pendency (also known as a “lis pendens”) was filed against the house, which operates as notice to outsiders that someone is laying claim to ownership of the house.

The owner denied the agreement, since there was no proof of the agreement between himself and the tenant. He also claimed that the mortgage payments made by the tenant were intended as rent.

Proving the Copy To Be a Duplicate of the Original

The next, important step was to nail down through the discovery phase the proof of the agreement. In general, contracts relating to the sale of real estate require written proof under a legal doctrine known as the Statute of Frauds. Since here, there was no writing other than the photocopy of the Deed, the lawsuit appeared to be futile.

The admissions requested were as follows:

  1. That the attached Deed was signed by the defendant on September 1, 1994.
  2. That the attached Deed was prepared by the defendant’s attorney, or on his behalf by a member of his staff or office.
  3. That the defendant’s attorney prepared the attached Deed at the request of, or on behalf of the defendant.
  4. That the original of the attached Deed was taken into escrow by the defendant’s attorney at or about the time of execution thereof.

Despite being served with this Notice to Admit, the defendant failed to respond to it within the 20-day time frame in which to respond. By virtue of his not timely responding, the above allegations were deemed “admitted.”

Since it was now admitted that the owner signed the Deed in favor of the tenant, and the Deed was to be held in escrow by his attorney, the terms of the agreement were arguably established in a manner allowed by the Statute of Frauds. Coupled with the fact that the tenant made all of the mortgage payments for 13 years, the owner elected to settle the case instead of proceeding to trial.

Richard A. Klass, Esq.
 

©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Der Schindanger in Livorno by Giovanni Fattori, 1865-1867.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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