With very limited exceptions, a party seeking to sue an attorney for legal malpractice must prove that he was the client of the attorney.

In Barrett v Goldstein, 161 AD3d 472, 473 [1st Dept 2018], the court dismissed the case, finding that the attorney-defendant was not the plaintiff’s attorney concerning drafting an agreement. The court specifically held:

“ The documentary evidence conclusively establishes that she was not acting as plaintiff’s attorney. Rather, the terms of the post-nuptial agreement which plaintiff now challenges, as well as numerous emails between plaintiff, his former wife, and Goldstein, reflect the parties’ understanding and agreement that Goldstein would draft the post-nuptial agreement, and the spouses’ separate counsel would review it before execution. Accordingly, plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged an attorney-client relationship between him and Goldstein, or that she was negligent and that her negligence was the “but for” cause of his alleged injuries. ”

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Next post
Previous post

…general dissatisfaction with the lawyer’s strategy…

Just because a client is dissatisfied with his lawyer, doesn’t mean that he can sue the lawyer for legal malpractice.

In Genet v Buzin, 159 AD3d 540 [1st Dept 2018], the court held that a general dissatisfaction with the lawyer’s strategy wasn’t enough to sustain a lawsuit against him. The court held: “Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment is “palpably insufficient” (MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Greystone & Co., Inc., 74 A.D.3d 499, 499, 901 N.Y.S.2d 522 [1st Dept. 2010] ). The allegations underlying the legal malpractice claim merely “reflect plaintiff[s’] dissatisfaction with defendants’ strategic choices and tactics; there is no showing that those choices and tactics were unreasonable” (Kassel v. Donohue, 127 A.D.3d 674, 674, 6 N.Y.S.3d 916 [1st Dept. 2015], lv dismissed 26 N.Y.3d 940, 17 N.Y.S.3d 57, 38 N.E.3d 800 [2015]; see also Rosner v. Paley, 65 N.Y.2d 736, 738, 492 N.Y.S.2d 13, 481 N.E.2d 553 [1985] ). The breach of contract claim is duplicative of the legal malpractice claim, since it arises from the same facts and alleges similar damages (see Rivas v. Raymond Schwartzberg & Assoc., PLLC, 52 A.D.3d 401, 861 N.Y.S.2d 313 [1st Dept. 2008] ).”

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Previous post
Next post

Important for parties in litigation to appear before court on all conferences and motion hearing dates

It is very important for parties in litigation to appear before the court on all conferences and motion hearing dates. In a recent legal malpractice case (Stein v Davidow, Davidow, Siegel & Stern, LLP, 157 AD3d 741, 742–43 [2d Dept 2018] , the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate their default. The court held that:

In order to vacate a default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015[a] [1]; Wright v. City of Poughkeepsie, 136 A.D.3d 809, 809, 24 N.Y.S.3d 523; Mazzio v. Jennings, 128 A.D.3d 1032, 1032, 8 N.Y.S.3d 596; Hanscom v. Goldman, 109 A.D.3d 964, 965, 972 N.Y.S.2d 76). A determination of whether an excuse is reasonable lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see GMAC Mtge., LLC v. Guccione, 127 A.D.3d 1136, 1138, 9 N.Y.S.3d 83; Herrera v. MTA Bus Co., 100 A.D.3d 962, 963, 954 N.Y.S.2d 631).

 Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the plaintiffs did not offer a reasonable excuse for their default. Neither the fact that Stein was proceeding pro se nor his claims that he was unaware of the consequences of failing to appear constitute a reasonable excuse (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Slavinski, 78 A.D.3d 1167, 1167, 912 N.Y.S.2d 285; Dorrer v. Berry, 37 A.D.3d 519, 520, 830 N.Y.S.2d 277). The plaintiffs’ remaining arguments to support their contention that their default should be excused are improperly raised for the first time on appeal, and have not been considered by this Court *743 see Tulino v. Tulino, 148 A.D.3d 755, 757, 48 N.Y.S.3d 258; Point Holding, LLC v. Crittenden, 119 A.D.3d 918, 920, 990 N.Y.S.2d 575).

As the plaintiffs failed to offer a reasonable excuse for their default, the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a potentially meritorious cause of action need not be addressed (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Dorvelus, 140 A.D.3d 850, 852, 32 N.Y.S.3d 631; Vested Bus. Brokers, Ltd. v. Ragone, 131 A.D.3d 1232, 1234, 17 N.Y.S.3d 447; Abdelqader v. Abdelqader, 120 A.D.3d 1275, 1276, 993 N.Y.S.2d 71). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate their default.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Previous post
Next post