…client’s allegations were previously addressed in a prior matter.

Posted on January 14, 2019 by Richard Klass

In Knox v Aronson, Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, 2018 NY Slip Op 09030 [1st Dept Dec. 27, 2018], the court dismissed a legal malpractice case where the client’s allegations were previously addressed in a prior matter. The court held:

Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint as against FBK, since the only claim asserted, a legal malpractice claim, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata (see Matter of Hunter, 4 N.Y.3d 260, 269, 794 N.Y.S.2d 286, 827 N.E.2d 269 [2005] ). Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim is based on the same conduct that was the basis of the counterclaim previously dismissed by Supreme Court Westchester County. Res judicata bars all claims “ arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions … even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy ” (Jumax Assoc. v. 350 Cabrini Owners Corp., 110 A.D.3d 622, 623, 973 N.Y.S.2d 631 [1st Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 907, 2014 WL 2922240 [2014]). Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the dismissal in the Westchester action was on the merits. The order addressed the merits of the counterclaim, dismissing it on the basis of the settlement and the custody decision in the matrimonial action (see Plaza PH2001 LLC v. Plaza Residential Owner LP, 98 A.D.3d 89, 98, 947 N.Y.S.2d 498 [1st Dept. 2012] ).

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Statute of Limitations for Causes of Action Alleging Legal Malpractice

Posted on January 7, 2019 by Richard Klass

The Second Department, in Potenza v Giaimo, 165 AD3d 1186, 1187 [2d Dept 2018], dismissed a client’s legal malpractice action against his attorney based upon the statute of limitations. The court held:

The statute of limitations for causes of action alleging legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214[6]; Alizio v. Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 126 A.D.3d 733, 735, 5 N.Y.S.3d 252). A cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice accrues when the malpractice is committed (see Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 N.Y.2d 164, 166, 726 N.Y.S.2d 365, 750 N.E.2d 67). However, pursuant to the doctrine of continuous representation, the limitations period is tolled until the attorney’s continuing representation of the client with regard to the particular matter terminates (see Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 N.Y.2d at 167–168, 726 N.Y.S.2d 365, 750 N.E.2d 67; Aqua–Trol Corp. v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, P.A., 144 A.D.3d 956, 957, 42 N.Y.S.3d 56). For the continuous representation doctrine to apply, “ there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney which often includes an attempt by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice ” (Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 A.D.2d 505, 506–507, 560 N.Y.S.2d 787).

R. A. Klass
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License to Enter and RPAPL 881: New Booklet by Richard A. Klass

Posted on December 12, 2018 by Richard Klass

A Man’s Home Is (Not Always) His Castle:
RPAPL 881 License to Enter Neighbor’s Property
by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Download the free E-Book version in PDF format.
A free on-line web-book is available here.
12 pages/830 KB

Summary

A Man’s Home Is (Not Always) His Castle

In the current economic and political climate in New York City, which encourages building more and more housing units for the multitudes, it is not surprising that property owners are experiencing “growing pains.” Among those “growing pains” are the inconvenience and annoyance to neighboring property owners when a developer buys land next door, then seeks to build on that land, and must gain access through the adjacent owners’ property in order to do the work. Access may be needed to move equipment, build up to the property line, or deliver material to the building site.

RPAPL 881 grants a license to enter property:

New York law seeks to find middle ground between the property developer and the neighboring owner so that the developer may build its structure while the neighbor can be left relatively undisturbed.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Intent to deceive and Judiciary Law Section 487

Posted on December 12, 2018 by Richard Klass

The court dismissed the claims against the attorney relating to intent to deceive, holding:

Under Judiciary Law Section 487, an attorney who “[i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party” is liable to the injured party for treble damages. “ [V]iolation of Judiciary Law Section 487 requires an intent to deceive, whereas a legal malpractice claim is based on negligent conduct ” (Moormann v. Perini & Hoerger, 65 A.D.3d 1106, 1108, 886 N.Y.S.2d 49 [citation omitted]; see Gorbatov v. Tsirelman, 155 A.D.3d 836, 838, 65 N.Y.S.3d 71).

Aristakesian v Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler, P.C., 165 AD3d 1023, 1025 [2d Dept 2018].

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Client alleged attorney failed to provide legal advice … immigration consequences

Posted on November 30, 2018 by Richard Klass

The First Department kept a legal malpractice case alive and partially denied the attorney’s motion to dismiss action, where the client alleged that the attorney failed to provide legal advice. In Sehgal v DiRaimondo, 165 AD3d 435, 436-37 [1st Dept 2018], the court held:

We affirm dismissal of part of the malpractice claim on alternative grounds. Plaintiff’s claim that he pleaded guilty to criminal charges in reliance on defendants’ negligent legal advice concerning the immigration consequences of the plea is barred by his guilty plea and lack of any claim of innocence (Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 173, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605, 511 N.E.2d 1126 [1987]; Yong Wong Park v. Wolff & Samson, P.C., 56 A.D.3d 351, 867 N.Y.S.2d 424 [1st Dept. 2008], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 704, 876 N.Y.S.2d 705, 904 N.E.2d 842 [2009] ). However, the policy underlying the rule established in Carmel v. Lunney, supra, does not require dismissal of the entirety of plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim, because the remainder of his claim that defendants failed to advise him of the potential immigration consequences of traveling outside the United States as a result of entering a guilty plea does not dispute the validity of his conviction (see generally Carmel v. Lunney, supra; see also Bass & Ullman v. Chanes, 185 A.D.2d 750, 586 N.Y.S.2d 610 [1st Dept. 1992] ). Further, plaintiff’s allegations that he relied on defendants’ faulty legal advice concerning the immigration consequences of his guilty plea in deciding to travel abroad after he pled guilty, resulting in his being detained and subjected to removal proceedings, state a valid cause of action for legal malpractice. Defendants’ other arguments present disputed factual issues concerning the standard of care and proximate cause that are not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss the complaint (see Urias v. Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Assoc., PLLC, 120 A.D.3d 1339, 1343, 992 N.Y.S.2d 552 [2d Dept. 2014] ).