Real Estate

Force ‘Em to Sell! The Right to Specific Performance

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In the typical real estate transaction, the seller is interested in selling the property, the buyer is interested in buying it, and the Contract of Sale is merely used to memorialize the deal and as the basis for the buyer to obtain a mortgage commitment from a mortgage lender. The closing takes place; everyone leaves happy!

Sometimes, however, the seller fails or refuses to comply with the Contract of Sale and sell the property to the buyer. In that circumstance, the legal ramifications of the Contract of Sale come into play. This was the situation in a recent case litigated by Richard A. Klass, “Your Court Street Lawyer,” and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau last month.
 
In Korzeniewski v. Estate of Poswolsky, the plaintiff wanted to buy a house in Long Beach, New York. Through a local real estate broker, he found a nice house owned by an 86-year old man looking to sell his house so he could downsize to an apartment. The Contract of Sale was signed, with a sale price of $465,000, in October 2003. Each side had been represented by counsel.
 
In November 2003, the owner/seller entered into the Nassau University Medical Center complaining of pains, and a pacemaker was installed. The medical records of the hospital had notations that the seller was sometimes disoriented and suffering from dementia. In December 2003, after voluntarily checking himself out of the hospital three weeks earlier, the owner died.
 
After the owner’s death, his son was appointed the executor of his estate by the Surrogate’s Court. The son/executor informed the buyer that he believed that the real estate broker took advantage of his father, and that the house was really worth more than $200,000 above the original $465,000 sale price. Accordingly, the son disavowed the Contract of Sale, indicating that he would only sell the property to this buyer if he paid the additional moneys.

Real estate is “unique property”:

One of the tenets of contract law is that real estate is considered a “unique” property – one which cannot be substituted with another. That is, just like a snowflake, one piece of property is not the same as any other. Since the house is unique, and no monetary award for breaching of the contract would satisfy the buyer, the buyer brought an action for specific performance against the son/executor. The substance of the action was the request for the judge to direct the executor to “specifically” perform the contract and transfer the Deed to the property for the original sale price.

Lack of evidentiary proof of dementia:

At the conclusion of discovery in the case, including the taking of depositions of the parties and the attorney for the owner/decedent (who happened to be a distant cousin of the owner), a motion was brought for summary judgment in favor of the buyer, awarding him specific performance of the contract. Attached as part of the proof in support of the motion was the petition filed by the executor with the Surrogate’s Court, in which he indicated that the value of the house was $500,000 at the time of death (less than 10% more than the sale price negotiated four months earlier).
 
In response, the executor put forth two proofs that his father was suffering from dementia and, therefore, lacked the mental capacity to sign the Contract of Sale, namely: (a) the medical records from Nassau University Medical Center (where the notations of dementia appeared in the records); and (b) the affidavit of a neurologist who neither examined the decedent nor consulted with any of his personal physicians, but relied solely upon the medical records which post-dated the signing of the Contract of Sale.

No need for a trial – just make the seller perform the real estate contract:

In granting summary judgment to buyer (which meant that the judge did not believe that there existed any factual issues to be decided by trial), the judge enforced the terms of the Contract of Sale to make the executor “specifically” perform the contract and sell the property for the original sale price. Relying upon case law, the judge found that the buyer proved that he “substantially performed [his] contractual obligations and was willing and able to perform the remaining obligations, that defendant was able to convey the property, and there was no adequate remedy at law.”
 
In disregarding the executor’s proofs, the judge found that he did not meet his burden of proving that the decedent was incompetent (in order to refute the presumption that people are considered mental competent and capable of making a contract). According to well settled law from the NYS Court of Appeals (Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board), the focus of the inquiry is whether the person’s mind was so affected as to render him wholly incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction at issue. In this case, the executor did not offer any proof that his father was so affected by dementia that he was unable to enter into the Contract of Sale. Further, there was no proof that he was forced or coerced into signing the contract.
by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
 

©2007 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: Der Steigbügel. Artist: Giovanni Fattori. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Court Upholds 25-Year Lease at Fixed $800 Rent

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In Borough Park, there lived an elderly couple in a house (the Kimmels). Their neighbor (Twersky) was interested in renting the first floor apartment for her son and his family. At the time that she rented the apartment, it was in poor shape and in very poor condition; indeed, the entire house needed extensive renovations. In 1995, Twersky and the Kimmels entered into a lease agreement to rent the first floor apartment.The lease agreement provided that the monthly rental amount was to be $800, and the lease term was for 25 years. As indicated in the lease agreement, throughout this time, the rental amount would not increase. Unstated in the lease agreement, however, but alleged by Twersky as a material aspect of the 25-year term at a low fixed rent was the fact that she needed to invest over $100,000 into the extensive renovation of the house, including a complete gut renovation of the first floor apartment. Separate from the lease agreement, Twersky entered into an Option to Purchase Agreement with the Kimmels, which would allow Twersky to purchase the entire house for $325,000 less rent paid until exercise of the option but in no event less than $300,000 (which option agreement was held unenforceable by the court).

Unconscionability Argument Fails:

The matter wound up in litigation after the elderly couple passed away and the executor of the surviving spouse’s estate (Kazaks) brought a “holdover” proceeding in Housing Court to evict Twersky from the apartment. Twersky then filed an action in the Supreme Court seeking an injunction to prevent Kazaks from evicting her family. Twersky relied upon both the option and lease agreements in her Complaint. Kazaks, for her part, claimed that (a) the 25-year lease was unenforceable as a matter of law; and (b) the purchase option agreement was unenforceable because not all of the heirs at law of original owners of the house signed it but just the Kimmels (who owned a portion of the house). She put forth two arguments concerning the lease: that, by law, a lease of 25 years with no rent increases throughout the term was unconscionable; and that the elderly couple suffered from various ailments and diseases during and after the time of lease execution.In making his decision, the trial judge (Justice Knipel) properly found that the lease agreement between Twersky and the Kimmels was valid and enforceable. The arguments by the executor that the lease agreement was unconscionable and should not be enforced pursuant to Real Property Law §235-c was determined to be without merit, and not supported by the evidence presented at trial. As Justice Knipel observed, the executor was “doubtless correct that a residential lease for a 25-year term is unusual, especially where, as here, no increases were provided for the entire term.”Real Property Law §235-c provides as follows:

  1. If the court as a matter of law finds a lease or any clause of the lease to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
  2. When it is claimed or appears to the court that a lease or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.

In Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 NY2d 1, 10 [1988], the NYS Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) held, “An unconscionable contract has been defined as one which ‘is so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the mores and business practices of the time and place as to be unenforceable according to its literal terms (See 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 128, p. 400.).’” As further enunciated by the Court, a determination of unconscionability generally requires a showing that the subject contract was both (a) procedurally and (b) substantively unconscionable when made, i.e., “some showing of an ‘absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.’” Gillman, supra at p. 10.At trial, Kazaks had not proven that the lease agreement was either procedurally or substantively unconscionable, by the standards set forth by the NYS Court of Appeals. There was no proof adduced at trial that there was an absence of meaningful choice or that the terms of the agreement were unreasonably unfavorable. On the contrary, all of the witnesses testified that the Kimmels were competent to act in their own affairs, and that the lease agreement was negotiated (including the 25-year term contained therein). Accordingly, Justice Knipel held “the court concludes that the lease is valid on its face and is enforceable.”

Appellate Division Ruling:

Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, was retained by Twersky to defend the appeal brought by Kazaks. By the decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, Twersky v. Kazaks, 868 NYS2d 912 [12/16/08], the appellate court ruled that the executor could not prove that the estate was an “aggrieved” party because the two causes of action in the original action were dismissed. Accordingly, the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal of Kazaks. Further, the Court affirmed (upheld) the decision after trial by Justice Knipel.By affirming the decision of Justice Knipel, the Appellate Division held that the 25-year lease at a fixed rent of $800 will remain in effect, and that Twersky may enforce the same in any future Housing Court proceedings between the parties.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Image from Foster, Tony (2008-09). “John Romney, Artist-Engraver (1785-1863)”. Cheshire History. Showing a house in Watergate St., Chester, England.


copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Seward Park apartment for $33K: “Too Good to be True”

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From The Low Down, news from the Lower East Side:

Grand St. Apartment for $33K: Too Good to be True
“…By contrast, a similar case that Salamon’s attorney, Richard Klass, is handling a few blocks away at the Hillman Housing Corp. has garnered no press attention. In that case, plaintiff Elena Slukina of Manhattan bid $180,000 on apartment #GD at 550H Grand St. in April, after the previous owner defaulted. Hillman is attempting to block that sale based on arguments similar to Seward Park’s, according to court documents filed in Supreme Court Sept. 16….”

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Seward Park co-op board voids sale of one-bedroom that went at auction for $329G

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Seward Park co-op board voids sale of one-bedroom that went at auction for $329G

BY Barbara Ross
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
Thursday, December 1 2011, 9:13 PM

“Linda Salamon thought she won the real estate lottery last May when she bought a $400,000 one-bedroom co-op apartment on the lower East Side for $329,000 at a public auction….”

“…Salamon declined to discuss her battle, but her lawyer Richard Klass said that under state law, the co-op board cannot exercise its right of first refusal because the sale is not voluntary; it was forced by the lender.

“He also noted that Seward Park’s board was notified of the auction and could have bid on the apartment when Salamon won the unit….”
# # #

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Feeling a Million Bucks Better!

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Bad economic times over the past few years have seen the foreclosure of tens of thousands of properties across New York State (as well as around the country). One corporate landlord had two commercial rental buildings located in Brooklyn. Spread across those two buildings was a ‘blanket’ mortgage of $1.1 million (the term ‘blanket mortgage’ refers to one mortgage recorded against two or more properties). The buildings fell into foreclosure as a result of the landlord’s inability to pay the mortgage loan and the general economic downturn in the area. The corporation that owned the buildings and the individual owner who signed a personal guaranty of the mortgage loan were sued in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding.

On September 30, 2010, the two buildings were sold at the foreclosure auction sale by the court-appointed Referee as one combined lot for $574,000. The mortgage lender’s attorneys prepared the Referee’s Report of Sale and Statement of the balance due to the lender on the mortgage loan after the auction sale (the “deficiency”), which was computed as follows: Total due Plaintiff: $1,408,111.61. Amount of Bid: $574,000. Deficiency: $834,111.61.

After the foreclosure auction sale, the plaintiff-mortgage lender filed a motion with the court, asking the judge to grant a Deficiency Judgment against the corporation and the individual owner based upon his personal guaranty. The defendants did not receive notice of the motion. The motion was granted and the court entered a Deficiency Judgment against them for $902,506.17.

The individual guarantor (and now judgment debtor), came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal advice to challenge the Deficiency Judgment.

Deficiency Judgment:

Mortgage foreclosures in New York are governed by Article 13 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL). The normal flow of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is: (a) filing and serving the Summons and Complaint; (b) having the court appoint a referee to determine how much is due to the lender on the mortgage loan; (c) granting the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, allowing the mortgage lender to “foreclose” the mortgage upon its collateral (security for the loan) – the house; and then (d) conduct an auction sale of the house to satisfy the debt owed.

Many times, the foreclosure auction sale of the property does not sell for enough money to pay off the debt due to the mortgage lender/bank. When a property is worth less than the amount due on the mortgage, the property is considered “underwater.” If, after the sale, the lender is still due money for its debt under the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, the lender may bring a request for the judge to award a judgment for the balance of the money due for its debt – it is asking for a Deficiency Judgment to be entered against the person or people liable under the mortgage note (the term “deficiency” referring to the remaining shortage due to the bank). The procedure for requesting the Deficiency Judgment is laid out in RPAPL Section 1371, and it must be strictly followed.

Attacking the Validity of the Deficiency Judgment:

At the stage that the client retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to help, a game plan to attack the Deficiency Judgment had to be formulated and put into action. The entire file in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, including all of the pleadings, motions, and court orders had to be obtained from court and reviewed to see whether every step taken by the mortgage lender was proper – in other words, did the mortgage lender cross every “t” and dot every “i”?

Motion made after 90-day time limit.

The Referee’s Deed from the auction sale was dated October 9, 2010. The date that the motion was served upon the defendants, January 11, 2011, exceeded the 90-day time limit specified in RPAPL 1371(2) by four days. New York case law has held that the 90-day time period in which to request that a deficiency be granted is considered a “ statute of limitations ” and, if not made within this period, it is time-barred. Thus, it was argued that the plaintiff-mortgage lender made the motion too late.

Improper calculation of the deficiency.

In RPAPL 1371(2), it states that the deficiency is the amount owing less “the market value determined by the court or the sale price of the property whichever shall be the higher.” The plaintiff calculated the deficiency based upon the lower sale price ($574,000) instead of the higher appraised fair market value ($675,000), which would have resulted in a lower deficiency amount (by over $100,000).

Both properties were sold together as one combined lot.

For some reason, the plaintiff opted to lump together two separate and distinct properties into one foreclosure sale. By conducting the sale of both properties at the same time, it was argued the plaintiff waived the right to claim a deficiency against the defendant. In Sanders v. Palmer, 68 NY2d 180 [1986], the Court of Appeals held that “there shall be separate sales of the security in such order as the court may fix, and an application after each sale and before the next occurs for determination of the deficiency resulting from the sale, for otherwise what remains due and payable from the additional security provided cannot be known.” Here, the plaintiff decided to sell both properties as a “package deal” without selling each property separately; therefore, the proper deficiency could not have been determined.

The personal guaranty was “limited” to $55,000.

But, perhaps, the most glaring mistake in the foreclosure proceedings was that the personal guaranty of the individual owner (attached to the Complaint) stated on its face that it was limited to only $55,000 of the mortgage debt plus the legal expenses and costs associated with protecting the collateral. This was not brought to the attention of the judge when the plaintiff made the motion for the deficiency.

Based upon the several errors in the motion and procedures taken to obtain the Deficiency Judgment, the plaintiff-mortgage lender agreed to vacate and dismiss the Deficiency Judgment against the individual guarantor. Instead of owing the bank close to $1 million, he wound up owing $0!

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Credits:
Photo of Richard Klass by Robert Matson, copyr. Richard A. Klass, 2011.
Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.
Image at top: The Merry Fiddler, 1623, by Gerard van Honthorst (1590-1656). This image is in the public domain because its copyright has expired. This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years. This image is in the public domain in the United States. This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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