The Wrong Side of the Tracks Costs Law Firm $800,000.

The Long Island Railroad (LIRR) leased one of its old rail yards in Queens to a recycling company. One of the recycling company’s employees was working the late shift on a rainy evening in 2003. That rainy night, he was assigned the task of welding on a portion of the metal fence surrounding the yard with an acetylene torch. He got up on a ladder, climbed up several rungs, and started to weld. At that point, the injured worker got a shock from the welding equipment. The ladder then shifted in the mud and he fell to the ground, suffering severe injuries. Since that incident, he was unable to work, having become disabled, and having had several surgeries to his back and knee.

The injured worker hired a law firm to bring a personal injury claim against the owner of the yard under New York’s Labor Law Section 240 known as the “Scaffolding Law.” That law firm brought a petition to file notices of claim against the MTA (Metropolitan Transportation Authority) and the LIRR. The Supreme Court Justice dismissed the petition, indicating in his decision that, as to the MTA, the reason for the late notice of claim was not meritorious and, as to the LIRR, no notice of claim was needed and that the law firm merely needed to timely commence a lawsuit under New York’s Public Authority Law. Needless to say, the time within which the injured worker needed to commence the lawsuit against the LIRR had already passed by the time of that decision. The injured worker retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer to sue the personal injury law firm for legal malpractice.

Time-barred by the Statute of Limitations:

The concept of a “ Statute of Limitations ” is that people are afforded a certain amount of time to take action concerning a legal claim they may have; if that period of time passes without taking action, then the ability to pursue the legal claim has been waived. Most people are familiar, for instance, that in New York State the statute of limitations period within which to file most personal injury cases is three years from the date of accident. In this particular case, though, the Statute of Limitations period within which to sue the potentially liable parties was shorter (to a period of one year and thirty days) because the personal injury claim was against the LIRR, a governmental authority under a special statute.

Once the judge had dismissed the injured worker’s lawsuit, thus leaving him without recourse to recover monetary damages for his injuries, the law firm was exposed to the legal malpractice claim brought against it because it was alleged to have “blown” the statute of limitations by neglecting to timely file the lawsuit against the LIRR.

In legal malpractice cases, the statute of limitations in which to sue an attorney is three years from the date of malpractice under New York’s CPLR Section 214(6). Since many times in litigation, attorneys who have committed malpractice continue representing their clients for months or years afterward, there is also a concept of “ continuous representation. ” This means that the statute of limitations “clock” does not start to tick until the attorney has stopped representing the client in the matter.

Proving the underlying case under Labor Law Section 240:

A legal malpractice case is a very difficult type of litigation for one particular reason: Assuming that the lawyer ‘screwed up’ as much as possible, doing everything as wrong as could be done or failing to do any of the right things, it still might not matter — the ultimate question for purposes of liability for legal malpractice will be whether there was any merit to the underlying case that the lawyer was hired to handle. Rephrased: Would the client have won “but for” his lawyer?!

New York’s Scaffolding Law provides that owners of real estate, such as the LIRR, are “strictly liable” for injuries suffered by workers who fall from a ladder or scaffold under almost all circumstances, with limited exceptions, such as if there was a lack of adequate safety devices. This basically means that the landowner is responsible to pay for all of the worker’s damages for his injuries, including medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. An exception to holding the landowner strictly liable under the Scaffolding Law is where the injured worker is found to have been the “ sole proximate cause ” of his injuries. In this case, the law firm being sued for legal malpractice argued that, in the event the LIRR had been sued, the injured worker would not have prevailed anyway because this exception to the Scaffolding Law would have applied because he knew not to weld in the rain. In response, the injured worker claimed that his employer at the yard instructed him to weld in the rain and that he was not going to be insubordinate.

Separate and apart from the Scaffolding Law issue, the law firm argued that there was no proof of exactly where the fall occurred to establish that it happened on the LIRR’s property. In response, a surveyor was retained to survey the area surrounding the old rail (now recycling) yard, and Deeds dating back to the 1800s were obtained. These documents were produced to establish the legal ownership of the location where the fall took place. This was a necessary element of the case in order to prove that the LIRR would have been liable for injuries to workers on its property under the Scaffolding Law.

The legal malpractice case came up for a pre-trial conference. Attorneys Richard A. Klass and Stefano A. Filippazzo appeared at the conference on behalf of the injured worker. The law firm being sued for legal malpractice finally settled with the injured worker for $800,000 to settle the action and pay for his injuries and extensive medical lien.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Art credits: page one, Hjørring – Hirtshals Line in Northern Denmark. Photograph by Tomasz Sienicki, 2003.

The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Next post
Previous post

Emergency and Expedited Legal Services

The economic downturn has created situations where many clients may need Emergency and Expedited Legal Services.

If you, a friend or a family member has a legal emergency and time is of the essence, call immediately.

I will answer your questions and provide an initial consultation AT NO CHARGE.  If you, or someone you know, is facing any of the following situations, it is imperative to quickly secure competent legal representation.
  • Need to save the home.
  • Need to avoid “fire-sale low-ball offers” on your real estate.
  • Bankruptcy protection that considers your needs (Chapters 7, 11 and 13)
  • Taking action when you or another homeowner has been lured into a foreclosure scam.
  • Any other situation involving the sudden loss of real estate.



copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Next post
Previous post

What Is a “Traverse” Hearing and Why Is It Important

Recently, I had the opportunity to successfully represent a client at a traverse hearing in the Civil Court. This article will illustrate the purpose and effect of such a hearing.

A ” traverse ” is a hearing conducted by a judge to determine whether the defendant was properly served with the Summons in the action. The ultimate result of such a hearing will be a determination that either the defendant was properly served and, therefore, must answer the Complaint, or that the defendant was not properly served and the action is deemed dismissed. Sometimes, this is the critical part of a case, especially where the time to commence a new action against the defendant has passed by virtue of the applicable statute of limitations.
 
In PRA III LLC v. Weisel, I represented the defendant, who claimed that the first time he learned of the existence of the case was when he received a copy of the judgment from the plaintiff’s counsel. Importantly, he claimed that he was never served with the Summons and Complaint by a ” process server, ” or someone authorized to serve such papers. [A “process server” in particular is someone who serves more than five Summonses within a year].
 
At the hearing, the process server was called to testify about his prior affidavit where he claimed that he served the Summons upon my client. The process server indicated on the affidavit he posted the Summons on the outer door of the defendant’s house, which may be permissible according to the statute. However, the defendant testified that he resided in the second floor apartment of a three-apartment house, and that the bells outside the common door are clearly marked with the occupants’ names. Service by posting the Summons on the outside door was deemed insufficient in this situation.
 
The service was also challenged in two other ways, which proved successful:
 
Firstly, process servers are required to maintain a “log book,” in which they note where and when they served process (or attempted to serve process unsuccessfully). Here, the process server’s log book did not contain any entry for the date of the alleged service of process.
 
Secondly, the defendant resided on a block in Boro Park, Brooklyn, which the process server conceded was a heavily Sabbath-observant Jewish neighborhood. By law, service of process on a Saturday upon someone whom the process server knows or should know to be Sabbath-observant is deemed defective.
 
The end result of the traverse was that the service of the Summons was not sustained as valid, and the action was dismissed. Now, the plaintiff is required to commence a new action if it wants to attempt collection of the debt (perhaps with a more diligent process server!).
 
by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
“Your Court Street Lawyer”
Copyright 2005
 
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
 
 

License Information

What Is a “Traverse” Hearing and Why Is It Important by Richard A. Klass, Esq. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. For permissions beyond the scope of this license, please contact Mr. Klass (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com). Insert the words “reprint permission request” in the subject line of the email.
 

Publishing Guidelines

Permission is granted to publish this article electronically in free-only publications, like a website or ezine (print and non-free publications require permission) as long as the resource box is included without any modifications. All links must be active. A courtesy copy is requested on publication (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com).
Article Title:
What Is a “Traverse” Hearing and Why Is It Important
Article URL is here.
Author Name:
Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Contact Email Address:
RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com
Word Count:
450 words

[This resource box must be included in any publications.]
* * *

Resource Box

About the Author:
Richard A. Klass, Esq. maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
Read the original article in context here.
Back issues from Mr. Klass’ quarterly newsletter, Law CURRENTS are available on the firm’s website.
Articles from Law CURRENTS may be available for reprint. Please see individual articles for license information.
* * *

 


copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Next post
Previous post

Obtaining Leave of Court to Submit Evidence in Reply Papers for ‘Good Cause Shown’

In litigation, parties may bring motions for dismissal of the action or affirmative defenses, or move for ‘summary judgment’ (that there are no genuine issues of fact and the judge can decide the case on the law alone). Generally, the moving party puts forward all of its proof in support of its motion, including any affidavits, documents or photographs. The opposing party then puts forward all of its proof. At that point, it is inappropriate for either party to provide additional facts in reply papers, as courts want to give each party an opportunity to properly respond to the facts alleged in the original papers. It would otherwise be unfair.

Sometimes, however, additional facts or proof become necessary for various reasons. In that situation, the party seeking to provide additional proof must show “good cause” for having to do it.

Pursuant to binding Appellate Division, First and Second Department precedents, supplemental affirmations and/or sur-reply’s are permissible upon leave of the court with good cause shown, particularly where (1) the movant submits evidence for the first time in its reply papers or (2) “where the offering party’s adversaries responded to the newly presented claim or evidence [citations omitted].” Kennelly v. Mobius Realty Holdings LLC, 33 A.D.3d 380, 381-382, 822 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (1st Dep’t 2006); see Gastaldi v. Chen, 56 A.D.3d 420, 420, 866 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (2d Dep’t 2008) (“The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in considering the surreply of the plaintiffs, which was in response to the gap-in-treatment argument raised in the defendants’ reply papers for the first time (see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raguzin, 12 A.D.3d 468, 469, 784 N.Y.S.2d 644).”); Hoffman v. Kessler, 28 A.D.3d 718, 719, 816 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (2d Dep’t 2006) (“Further, the court properly considered the affidavit of a medical expert submitted by the plaintiffs in reply papers because the defendants had an opportunity to respond and submit papers in sur-reply (see Guarneri v. St. John, 18 A.D.3d 813, 813-814, 795 N.Y.S.2d 462; Matter of Hayden v. County of Nassau, 16 A.D.3d 415, 416, 790 N.Y.S.2d 404; Basile v. Grand Union Co., 196 A.D.2d 836, 837, 602 N.Y.S.2d 30; Fiore v. Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr., 164 A.D.2d 737, 739, 565 N.Y.S.2d 799, affd. 78 N.Y.2d 572, 578 N.Y.S.2d 115, 585 N.E.2d 364, cert. denied 506 U.S. 823, 113 S.Ct. 75, 121 L.Ed.2d 40).”); Anderson v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 31 A.D.3d 284, 288, 819 N.Y.S.2d 241, 244 (1st Dep’t 2006); Traders Co. v. AST Sportswear, Inc., 31 A.D.3d 276, 277, 819 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240-241 (1st Dep’t 2006) (“Defendants also belatedly submitted papers containing a security deposit argument without demonstrating good cause (CPLR 2214[c] ), which was improperly relied upon by the IAS Court (see Pinkow v. Herfield, 264 A.D.2d 356, 358, 695 N.Y.S.2d 20 [1999]).”).

Further binding Appellate Division, Second Department precedents hold that “[c]ontrary to the [movant’s] contention, the court did not err by considering the evidence in the [cross-movant’s] reply papers because it was submitted in direct response to allegations raised in their opposition papers [citations omitted].” Conte v. Frelen Associates, LLC, 51 A.D.3d 620, 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (2d Dep’t 2008); see Jones v. Geoghan, 61 A.D.3d 638, 639, 876 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (2d Dep’t 2009) (“Although the appellants expressly raised a defense based on the emergency doctrine for the first time in their reply papers, we may consider it on appeal. In the first instance, the defense was raised in direct response to the allegation made in the plaintiff’s opposition papers that the decedent was struck by a van in motion, rather than thrown into the path of a stopped van (see Conte v. Frelen Assoc., LLC, 51 A.D.3d 620, 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d 258; Ryan Mgt. Corp. v. Cataffo, 262 A.D.2d 628, 630, 692 N.Y.S.2d 671; see also Kelsol Diamond Co. v. Stuart Lerner, 286 A.D.2d 586, 587, 730 N.Y.S.2d 218).”); Ryan Management Corp. v. Cataffo, 262 A.D.2d 628, 630, 692 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (2d Dep’t 1999) (“The defendant characterized the evidence in the reply papers as new evidence not properly before the court. Accordingly, the defendant argued, the court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant. …Because the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in its reply papers was in direct response to allegations raised by the defendant in his opposition papers, it was properly considered by the court.”).

In a recent action litigated by Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, the defendant submitted photographs of a sign with defendant’s reply affirmation, after plaintiff’s opposition and cross-motion had been submitted, as evidence that the entrance near a certain street, within 50-60 feet of which plaintiff had repeatedly testified his accident occurred, was located at another street, thousands of feet away. In his reply affirmation on his cross-motion, not in a sur-reply, plaintiff requested leave of this Honorable Court to submit (a) further photographs clearly depicting the entrance gate at the particular street indicated, with an identical sign about which he had been testifying, adjacent to which plaintiff testified his accident occurred in his EBT, as well as (b) a supplemental affidavit from plaintiff, authenticating these photographs as fair and accurate representations of the entrance about which he had testified. Accordingly, as the evidence (a) was submitted with a reply affirmation on his cross-motion, not a sur-reply, (b) plaintiff properly asked leave of the court to submit additional evidence in his reply on his cross-motion, in order to respond to the photograph submitted in defendant’s reply on the underlying motion, and (c) defendant has availed itself of the opportunity to respond thereto, this evidence is properly before this Honorable Court. See Gastaldi, 56 A.D.3d at 420, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 751; Conte, 51 A.D.3d at 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 260; Kennelly, 33 A.D.3d at 381-382, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 266; Traders Co., 31 A.D.3d at 277, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 240-241.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Next post
Previous post

Striking the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations in a Legal Malpractice Action

When a former client sues his attorney for legal malpractice, the defendant-attorney/law firm will almost invariably put forward, as part of its defense of the law suit, the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations. In New York State, the period in which an attorney may be sued (whether for a tort [civil wrong] or breach of contract) is generally three (3) years from the date of malpractice. If the client does not sue the attorney/law firm within the applicable Statute of Limitations period, then the case is “time barred” and may be dismissed as having been filed too late.

When the defendant attorney alleges in his Answer to the law suit that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, it is essential to deal with the issue as soon as practicably possible. One effective way is to make a motion to the trial judge to “strike” (or dismiss) the Affirmative Defense from the Answer. Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 3211(b) provides that a party may move to strike an affirmative defense.

Affirmative Defense – Statute of Limitations:

In a recent case, the defendant law firm asserted the Affirmative Defense that the legal malpractice action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In response, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, brought a motion to dismiss the Affirmative Defense. The motion requested that this affirmative defense be stricken, since it was alleged that the plaintiff-injured person brought the action within the applicable three-year statute of limitations period, as specified in CPLR 214(6).

CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.

The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].

In the recent case, the allegation of legal malpractice against the defendant law firm was that there was a ‘blown’ statute of limitations because the law firm did not timely sue the potentially liable party. In that situation, the New York State Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. In Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authority, 79 NY2d 777 [1991], the Court of Appeals held:

A person has one year from the date a claim accrues to commence an action against a public authority such as LIRR (Public Authorities Law Section 1276(2). The complaint must contain an allegation that at least 30 days have elapsed since the authority was presented with a demand or claim and that the authority has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the claim. This “stay” of 30 days is not counted as part of the limitations period and the plaintiff therefore may serve a complaint at any time up to one year and 30 days after the claim has accrued.

In the case, the plaintiff’s incident was alleged to have occurred on June 4, 2003. According to Public Authorities Law §1276, an action would have to have been brought against the LIRR within one year and thirty days after the incident. The defendant law firm was alleged to have failed to timely do so and the time in which to do so passed on their ‘watch.’

The Continuous Representation Toll:

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is ‘tolled’ during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

In the case, the defendant law firm was alleged to have continuously represented the injured plaintiff up until August 2007, as represented by the proceedings brought on his behalf and the correspondence between the parties. Accordingly, the Statute of Limitations in which to sue the defendant law firm for legal malpractice for having missed the opportunity to have sued the proper party for the incident that resulted in the client’s injury started ticking when the law firm no longer represented him.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

Next post
Previous post