Feeling a Million Bucks Better!

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Bad economic times over the past few years have seen the foreclosure of tens of thousands of properties across New York State (as well as around the country). One corporate landlord had two commercial rental buildings located in Brooklyn. Spread across those two buildings was a ‘blanket’ mortgage of $1.1 million (the term ‘blanket mortgage’ refers to one mortgage recorded against two or more properties). The buildings fell into foreclosure as a result of the landlord’s inability to pay the mortgage loan and the general economic downturn in the area. The corporation that owned the buildings and the individual owner who signed a personal guaranty of the mortgage loan were sued in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding.

On September 30, 2010, the two buildings were sold at the foreclosure auction sale by the court-appointed Referee as one combined lot for $574,000. The mortgage lender’s attorneys prepared the Referee’s Report of Sale and Statement of the balance due to the lender on the mortgage loan after the auction sale (the “deficiency”), which was computed as follows: Total due Plaintiff: $1,408,111.61. Amount of Bid: $574,000. Deficiency: $834,111.61.

After the foreclosure auction sale, the plaintiff-mortgage lender filed a motion with the court, asking the judge to grant a Deficiency Judgment against the corporation and the individual owner based upon his personal guaranty. The defendants did not receive notice of the motion. The motion was granted and the court entered a Deficiency Judgment against them for $902,506.17.

The individual guarantor (and now judgment debtor), came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal advice to challenge the Deficiency Judgment.

Deficiency Judgment:

Mortgage foreclosures in New York are governed by Article 13 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL). The normal flow of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is: (a) filing and serving the Summons and Complaint; (b) having the court appoint a referee to determine how much is due to the lender on the mortgage loan; (c) granting the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, allowing the mortgage lender to “foreclose” the mortgage upon its collateral (security for the loan) – the house; and then (d) conduct an auction sale of the house to satisfy the debt owed.

Many times, the foreclosure auction sale of the property does not sell for enough money to pay off the debt due to the mortgage lender/bank. When a property is worth less than the amount due on the mortgage, the property is considered “underwater.” If, after the sale, the lender is still due money for its debt under the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, the lender may bring a request for the judge to award a judgment for the balance of the money due for its debt – it is asking for a Deficiency Judgment to be entered against the person or people liable under the mortgage note (the term “deficiency” referring to the remaining shortage due to the bank). The procedure for requesting the Deficiency Judgment is laid out in RPAPL Section 1371, and it must be strictly followed.

Attacking the Validity of the Deficiency Judgment:

At the stage that the client retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to help, a game plan to attack the Deficiency Judgment had to be formulated and put into action. The entire file in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, including all of the pleadings, motions, and court orders had to be obtained from court and reviewed to see whether every step taken by the mortgage lender was proper – in other words, did the mortgage lender cross every “t” and dot every “i”?

Motion made after 90-day time limit.

The Referee’s Deed from the auction sale was dated October 9, 2010. The date that the motion was served upon the defendants, January 11, 2011, exceeded the 90-day time limit specified in RPAPL 1371(2) by four days. New York case law has held that the 90-day time period in which to request that a deficiency be granted is considered a “ statute of limitations ” and, if not made within this period, it is time-barred. Thus, it was argued that the plaintiff-mortgage lender made the motion too late.

Improper calculation of the deficiency.

In RPAPL 1371(2), it states that the deficiency is the amount owing less “the market value determined by the court or the sale price of the property whichever shall be the higher.” The plaintiff calculated the deficiency based upon the lower sale price ($574,000) instead of the higher appraised fair market value ($675,000), which would have resulted in a lower deficiency amount (by over $100,000).

Both properties were sold together as one combined lot.

For some reason, the plaintiff opted to lump together two separate and distinct properties into one foreclosure sale. By conducting the sale of both properties at the same time, it was argued the plaintiff waived the right to claim a deficiency against the defendant. In Sanders v. Palmer, 68 NY2d 180 [1986], the Court of Appeals held that “there shall be separate sales of the security in such order as the court may fix, and an application after each sale and before the next occurs for determination of the deficiency resulting from the sale, for otherwise what remains due and payable from the additional security provided cannot be known.” Here, the plaintiff decided to sell both properties as a “package deal” without selling each property separately; therefore, the proper deficiency could not have been determined.

The personal guaranty was “limited” to $55,000.

But, perhaps, the most glaring mistake in the foreclosure proceedings was that the personal guaranty of the individual owner (attached to the Complaint) stated on its face that it was limited to only $55,000 of the mortgage debt plus the legal expenses and costs associated with protecting the collateral. This was not brought to the attention of the judge when the plaintiff made the motion for the deficiency.

Based upon the several errors in the motion and procedures taken to obtain the Deficiency Judgment, the plaintiff-mortgage lender agreed to vacate and dismiss the Deficiency Judgment against the individual guarantor. Instead of owing the bank close to $1 million, he wound up owing $0!

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Credits:
Photo of Richard Klass by Robert Matson, copyr. Richard A. Klass, 2011.
Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.
Image at top: The Merry Fiddler, 1623, by Gerard van Honthorst (1590-1656). This image is in the public domain because its copyright has expired. This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years. This image is in the public domain in the United States. This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Who Are You and Why Are You Suing Me?! The Debt Buyer Phenomenon.

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He got the Summons and Complaint from a process server in 2007. The name of the plaintiff suing the defendant was “New Century Financial.” He had never heard of the plaintiff and did not know why it was suing him. The Complaint claimed that the defendant had a Providian credit card account and owed money on the account. He remembered having an account with Providian a long time ago and also remembered making his last payment to Providian in the Fall of 2000. Many people still remember the fall-out of the Savings and Loan crisis in the 1980s, and the take-over of bank assets by the FDIC and RTC, including hard assets (such as buildings) and monetary instruments (such as promissory notes); those assets were sold to third party investors and collected upon by them. In the 1990s, an offshoot of that industry began in full force – the purchase of credit card charge-offs, auto loan deficiencies and other debts owed by consumers. Debt brokers began buying nationwide and statewide portfolios of debt, and selling them to debt buyers in every imaginable stratification. When the defendant in this case got sued by New Century Financial, he turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to defend himself against this debt buyer’s claims.

Statute of Limitations:

In almost every type of case that a person may bring against someone, there is a time in which that case may be brought, and once that time has passed, the “ statute of limitations ” for that type of case prohibits a late case from being brought. There are various reasons for this rule, including failing memories, loss of evidence, and fairness to litigants. According to New York State law, in Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Section 213(2), the statute of limitations to sue someone for breaching a contract is six years from the date of breach. In this case, one of the defenses put forth by the defendant was that his last payment to Providian was made in the year 2000, and the lawsuit was filed by New Century Financial in the year 2007; seemingly, the six-year statute of limitations period in which to bring the case had already passed. Since the defendant did not have records of all of his payments to Providian, there was an issue as to whether the last payment was, in fact, made in the year 2000.

Who are you and why are you suing me?!

More importantly, a much more compelling defense was asserted by the defendant that New Century Financial lacked “standing” to bring the case. The defendant admitted that he may have previously owed a balance on his credit card bill due to Providian; he even saved some of the old dunning letters that he received from Providian. But why was someone he never heard of before suing him for that balance. In addition to the statute of limitations, there is another fundamental of law, the issue of standing. When someone brings a lawsuit against another, he has to prove that he may legally do so; in other words, that he owns the claim he is bringing. One of the common problems in these so-called “debt buyer” cases is that the plaintiff cannot prove that it is the rightful owner of the debt allegedly owed by the defendant.

The defendant took a very simple legal position – if Providian showed up to collect its debt, it may be due; but, the plaintiff cannot show it owns the debt. This called into question an evidentiary issue as to whether New Century Financial could prove the chain of title from Providian to itself. After pressing for disclosure of the purchase agreements and other evidence of the alleged assignment of the credit card account from Providian to New Century Financial, the debt buyer finally capitulated. New Century Financial agreed to discontinue the lawsuit WITH PREJUDICE (meaning that it cannot bring the lawsuit against the defendant again in the future).

Changes developing in the law:

Across the country, various governmental agencies have been busy trying to address the problems encountered between debt buyers and consumers. The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits many forms of harassment and abuse by debt collectors who collect debts owed by consumers to creditors. In recent years, the FDCPA has redefined the term “debt collector” to include “debt buyers” to curb their abuses. The New York City Administrative Code, which requires the licensing of debt collection agencies with the Department of Consumer Affairs, was amended to include debt buyers.

By the directives of the Chief Clerk on May 13, 2009, new requirements came into action in the New York City Civil Court system to directly address two common problems with debt buyer cases. The first one is that, when a plaintiff applies to the clerk for entry of a default judgment against the defendant, the papers must include an affidavit from the plaintiff or its attorney that it has “reason to believe that the statute of limitations has not expired.” The second one is that, when a plaintiff applies to the clerk for entry of a default judgment against the defendant, the papers must include (a) an affidavit of sale from the original creditor and not an agent; (b) an affidavit from any intermediaries who owned the debt before assignment to the plaintiff; and (c) an affidavit from the plaintiff attesting to the chain of title from the original creditor to it.Without doubt, the changes being put into effect, coupled with the difficulties of debt buyers in obtaining documents and witnesses from the original creditor, will tilt the scales of justice towards consumers for some time.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Porträt eines Mannes mit Hellebarde (4th quarter of the 17th century). Artist: Aert de Gelder. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.
———–
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Seminar Announcement: “Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law”

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In early November, Richard Klass will help present a seminar entitled The Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law.  This seminar, presented by the National Business Institute, will take place at the Hyatt Place Garden City, in Garden City, New York.  Information follows.

Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law

Date: Wednesday, November 09, 2011

Time: 9:00 am-4:30 pm

Location:

Hyatt Place Garden City
5 North Avenue
Garden City, NY

Facility Phone: 516-222-6277

NBI Product ID#: 57049ER

Program Description

Ensure Your Clients Get Paid
Winning a judgment against a bad debt doesn’t necessarily mean cash in hand. Do you have a firm grasp of the procedures for legally collecting that debt? Are your recovery actions in compliance with the strict guidelines governing collection? Don’t rush in unprepared. Maximize your chances for recovery with the practical steps provided in this strategic seminar. Enroll today!

  • Avoid collection activities that violate the FDCPA and/or state laws. 
  • Learn best practices for discovering debtor assets both pre- and post-judgment. 
  • Recognize what provisional and final remedies are available to creditors to collect what is owed. 
  • Walk through the procedural steps for executing wage garnishments, judgment liens, attachments and other methods of collection. 
  • Know the creditor’s rights when collecting debt and when the debtor files for bankruptcy.
 

Who Should Attend

This basic-to-intermediate level seminar is primarily designed for attorneys and other legal professionals. Those who may also benefit from the collection techniques provided include: collection and loan officers, accounts receivable personnel, credit managers, bankers and controllers.

Course Content

  1. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and State Collection Laws
  2. Ethical Issues in Collection
  3. How to Find Debtors and Their Assets
  4. Obtaining a Judgment: A Procedural Guide
  5. Collecting a Judgment: A Procedural Guide
  6. Creditors’ Rights When a Debtor Files Bankruptcy
Continuing Education Credits:

Continuing Legal Education
CLE 7.20 – NJ
CLE 7.00 – NY*

Continuing Professional Education for Accountants
CPE for Accountants: 7.00

Institute of Certified Bankers

ICB: 6.75*

* denotes specialty credits

Agenda

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) AND STATE COLLECTION LAWS

9:00 – 9:45, Richard A. Klass
Scope of the FDCPA
Understanding the Actions Permitted or Restricted by the Act
Demand Letters: Pitfalls to Avoid
Liability and Defenses
State Collection Laws and Their Application/Preemption
ETHICAL ISSUES IN COLLECTION
9:45 – 10:45, Richard A. Klass
Communication With Clients and Other Parties
Disclosure Issues
Aggressive Collection Practices
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Reporting Professional Misconduct
HOW TO FIND DEBTORS AND THEIR ASSETS
11:00 – 12:00, Michael Cardello III
Prejudgment Discovery Methods
Personal vs. Business Assets
Replevin/Self-Help Repossession Considerations
OBTAINING A JUDGMENT: A PROCEDURAL GUIDE
1:00 – 2:00, Michael Cardello III
Filing the Lawsuit
Service of Process
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
Judgments (Default, Summary, etc.)
COLLECTING A JUDGMENT: A PROCEDURAL GUIDE
2:15 – 3:15, Kenneth H. Wurman
Post-Judgment Discovery
Judgment Liens
Wage and Bank Account Garnishment
Attachments
Writ of Execution/Seize and Sale by Sheriff
Charging Orders
Debtor Slow-Pay Motions
Turnover/Receivership
Exemptions by Debtors
Dealing With Fraudulent Transfers
CREDITORS’ RIGHTS WHEN A DEBTOR FILES BANKRUPTCY

3:15 – 4:30, Michael D. Brofman

Speakers

RICHARD A. KLASS is an attorney in the Brooklyn office of Your Court Street Lawyer. Mr. Klass is an arbitrator for the small claims part of the civil court of the City of New York, County of Kings. He practices in the areas of collections, bankruptcy, debtor and creditor, commercial litigation, legal malpractice, medical malpractice, personal injury, real estate condominium law, family law, divorce, child custody and private placement adoption law, wills, probate, trusts and estates. Mr. Klass has written numerous articles and has lectured frequently for the Brooklyn Bar Association and New York County Lawyers Association, as well as other professional groups and organizations. Mr. Klass is a member of The American Association for Justice, the New York State Bar Association, the New York County Lawyers Association (chair, The Mentoring Program, Group Mentoring Program) and the Brooklyn Volunteer Lawyers Project (Pro Bono Counsel). He earned his B.A. degree from Hofstra University and his J.D. degree from New York Law School.

MICHAEL D. BROFMAN is a member in the New Hyde Park law firm of Weiss & Zarett P.C., where he practices in the areas of bankruptcy law, debtor/creditor rights, non-judicial workouts and commercial litigation. He has lectured for the Nassau County and New York State bar associations on topics relating to his areas of practice, and is a frequent lecturer for National Business Institute on bankruptcy and secured creditor topics. He is a member of the Nassau County (member, Bankruptcy and Bank sections) and the New York State (member, Committee on Bankruptcy Law and General Practice Section) bar associations, the American Bankruptcy Institute and the Volunteer Lawyer’s Project Pro Bono Bankruptcy Panel. Mr. Brofman earned his B.A. degree from the State University of New York at Binghamton and his J.D. degree from Fordham University.

MICHAEL CARDELLO III is a partner in the Litigation Department of Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP, concentrating in business and commercial litigation. Mr. Cardello represents large and small businesses, financial institutions and individuals in federal and state courts. He has a wide range of experience that includes trials and appellate work in the areas of corporate disputes, shareholder derivative actions, dissolutions, construction disputes, equipment and vehicle leasing disputes and other complex commercial and business disputes. Mr. Cardello earned his B.A. degree in marketing, his M.B.A. degree in finance and his J.D. degree from Hofstra University. While in law school, he was associate editor of the Hofstra Law Review. Mr. Cardello is the current vice-chairman of the Commercial Litigation Committee of the Nassau County Bar Association and also is a member of the Alternative Dispute Resolution and Securities Committee of the Nassau County Bar Association. He lectures on discovery, trial practice, equipment and vehicle leasing issues and e-discovery.

KENNETH H. WURMAN is a partner in the law firm of Naidich Wurman Birnbaum & Maday, LLP, where his practice areas, for more than 30 years, include collections and real estate. Mr. Wurman is a lecturer for National Business Institute on collection matters. He earned his B.S. degree from the State University of New York at Albany and his J.D. degree from New England School of Law. Mr. Wurman is a member of the Nassau County and New York State bar associations.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.

The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Don’t Give Me a Black Russian!

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IN 2006, the executor of the estate of a woman who owned a cooperative apartment in Brooklyn attempted to sell the apartment. She first made a contract with a black woman who had two children to sell the apartment for $160,000. The contract of sale provided (as almost all do in cooperative apartment sales) that the buyer had to apply to the coop board for approval of the sale. She applied to the coop board for approval; then, dissention came about between the resident board members and the sponsor-management company. Despite supposedly being “approved” by the residents on the board, the management company claimed that the board was not legally constituted; accordingly, no closing of title would be scheduled.

The buyer elected to file a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, charging that the coop engaged in discriminatory housing practices against her based upon her race. The NYS Division of Human Rights made a determination after investigation that there was “probable cause” to believe that the respondents engaged in discriminatory practices.The executor then attempted to sell the apartment to another person, a young Russian woman whom the board declined to even interview. It started to appear to the executor that a cooperative apartment owner’s fear of having every potential buyer denied, like a revolving door, was happening here.Faced with the possibility of the estate being left with a “dead asset”—an apartment that cannot be disposed of by the estate and continues to incur monthly maintenance charges, the estate turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to sue the coop board for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the proprietary lease and housing discrimination.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty:

According to New York State law, the directors of a corporation owe its shareholders a fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty of a director of a corporation consists of the obligation to perform his duties in good faith, without discriminatory practice, and with the degree of care which an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. See, Bernheim v. 136 East 64th Street Corp.,128 AD2d 434 [1 Dept. 1987]. In the Complaint against the coop, it was alleged that the coop board breached its fiduciary duty to the estate as the owner of shares of stock in the corporation and the proprietary lease to the apartment.In a similar case, in which the owner of a cooperative unit sued the board members for rejecting applicants for various reasons, including discriminatory ones, the court noted that the general deference granted to decisions of a cooperative corporation’s board of directors is not unlimited. If those board members act in a manner which is contrary to their duty to act fairly and impartially, courts may review claims of misconduct. Further, upon review, those claims of misconduct may prove actionable against the board members. See, Axelrod v. 400 Owners Corp., 189 Misc.2d 461 [Sup.Ct., NY Co. 2001].

The Estate was “Personally Affected” by Discrimination:

Both New York Executive Law §296 and New York City Administrative Code §8-107 provide that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for a cooperative housing corporation to discriminate against an applicant based upon his age, race, familial status or religion. Those statutes also provide that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, or compel the doing of any acts forbidden under those statutes. In Dunn v. Fishbein, 123 AD2d 659 [2 Dept. 1986], the court permitted a Caucasian person to maintain a claim that he was denied an apartment because his roommate was African-American. As was held in Axelrod v. 400 Owners Corp.,189 Misc.2d 461 [Sup.Ct., NY Co. 2001], if the plaintiff can show that she was adversely affected by reason of discrimination perpetrated against the prospective purchasers, she has a cognizable claim for discrimination. The Complaint alleged that the estate was personally affected by the unlawful discriminatory practices of the coop board and coop corporation.

“ Reverse Holdover ”:

The Complaint suggested the creation of a new cause of action under New York law—the concept of a “reverse holdover.” In this case, the estate claimed that the defendants effectively prevented the estate from exercising its right to sell the apartment to another party. Accordingly, it was urged that the defendants should be deemed to have effectively “purchased” the estate’s shares and leasehold interest in the apartment. By their alleged actions, it was claimed that the defendants had rendered this asset of the estate a “dead” asset—it could not be disposed of or sold!Generally, a tenant may be subject to eviction because of a substantial violation of the terms of the tenancy. In this situation, the reverse had occurred—the Complaint claimed that the defendants have committed a substantial violation of the estate’s tenancy. It is axiomatic that in every cooperative corporation, the right to sell a cooperator’s apartment is a valuable right, which ought not be irrationally or arbitrarily taken away. It is safe to say that the whim and caprice of coop boards is one of the prime reasons that people prefer to buy condominiums.In upholding the estate’s Complaint, the judge held that the estate had stated “ cognizable causes of action.” Estate of Cameron v. United Management, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 2671/2008. During the pendency of the litigation, the estate found another buyer for the apartment, albeit at a lower price than originally negotiated with the first buyer. The estate, coop board, and management company settled the litigation—the estate sold the apartment for $139,000 and the defendants paid $35,000 to the estate.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
 

©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Man in uniform beside building, yurt in background (1905-1915). Photographer: Prokudin-Gorskii, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1863-1944. Digital color composite made for the Library of Congress by Blaise Agüera y Arcas, 2004. Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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Making Sure the Guarantor is a “Good Guy.”

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In 1997, a landlord rented a commercial space to a tire company pursuant to a commercial lease agreement. The tenant defaulted in the payment of rent, owing the landlord the claimed arrearage sum of $157,000. To collect the rent arrears, the landlord came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer to recover.

When the lease was entered into, the president of the tenant executed the lease agreement both as president of the tenant and as personal guarantor of performance and payment of rent. The initial term of the lease agreement was for two years, and it provided for two-year renewal periods, with all of the terms and conditions of the original lease expressly reserved. The president of the tenant signed letter agreements extending the lease four times, the last time being December 20, 2004.

The landlord brought a motion for summary judgment against the personal guarantor of the lease, seeking payment of all outstanding arrears; the guarantor cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the case. The guarantor contended that he was not a proper party, claiming that he notified the landlord in February 2005 that the tenant was going out of business and all of its assets were being transferred to a different entity, effective March 2005. The landlord refuted receiving this notice from the guarantor.

Motion for Summary Judgment:

The term “summary judgment” means that a litigant is claiming that there is no reason to have a trial (either by judge or jury) because the case can be decided based upon application of the law. A “motion” is basically a request for a judge to take some sort of action.
 

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, as it deprives a party of his day in court, and should be granted when it is clear that there are no triable issues of fact. See, Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]. The burden is upon the moving party (the landlord in this case) to make a prima facie (Latin term for “by its first instance”) showing that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of any material facts. See, Giuffrida v. Citibank, 100 NY2d 72 [2003]. The failure to make that showing requires the denial of the motion regardless of the adequacy of the opposing papers. See, Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]. Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party (the tenant in this case) to produce evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which necessitate a trial.

In this case, the judge decided that the landlord laid out its case that the tenant owed rent arrears. This was based upon the evidence submitted with the motion, including the written lease agreement, the letters extending the lease for several additional terms, and the rent ledger. The judge dismissed the evidence presented by the guarantor, which amounted to his affidavit and the supposed notice that the tenant was ceasing business and a new company would be the tenant going forward.

Restriction on Assignment of Lease:

The argument that the tenant had given notice of assignment of the lease to a new company was refuted by the specific provisions of the lease. A provision in a lease which restricts assignment or subletting, and requires the consent of the landlord prior to doing so, is enforceable. See, Matter of Clason Management Co. v. Altman, 40 AD2d 635 [1 Dept. 1972]. The lease agreement at issue had such a restriction, which explicitly barred the tenant from assigning or transferring the lease or subletting the premises unless the tenant obtained the prior written consent of the landlord. Thus, even if the landlord did receive the letter from the guarantor in February 2005, there was no showing that the mandated consent was ever procured from the landlord.

Enforceability of Personal Guaranty:

It is no secret to landlords that, unless the incoming tenant is a large corporation, a commercial tenant is essentially a shell entity whose assets can disappear overnight (nowadays, even large corporations could qualify). So, landlords insist upon obtaining signed personal guaranties from the principals of the corporate tenants. Sometimes, the guaranty will be for all lease obligations through the end of the lease term, and sometimes, the guaranty will be effective through the date the tenant physically moves out of the premises – the proverbial “good guy clause.”

In this case, the landlord obtained the guaranty through the end of the lease term, but still expected the guarantor to be a “good guy” and pay the rent. Generally, a guaranty is to be interpreted in the strictest manner. See, White Rose Food v. Saleh, 99 NY2d 589 [2003]. But it is also the case that a personal guaranty which contains language of a continuing obligation is enforceable and survives payment of the original indebtedness. USI Capital and Leasing v. Chertock, 172 AD2d 235 [1 Dept. 1991]. Thus, termination of a continuing personal guaranty requires compliance with the provisions governing termination expressly set forth in the guaranty. In the absence of some writing which addresses termination, a guaranty which is silent on that issue remains in full force and effect. See, Chemical Bank v. Geronimo Auto Parts Corp., 224 AD2d 461 [1 Dept. 1996]. In this case, the personal guaranty could not be canceled merely by the president of the tenant sending a notice, indicating that the old company was going out and a new one was coming in.

In granting the landlord’s motion for summary judgment, the judge held that the personal guarantor is liable to the landlord, based upon his guarantee of the tenant’s lease obligations. Ribellino v. Fleet 2000, Inc. and Rosenfeld, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 7501/2008 [Decision dated October 7, 2009].

Richard A. Klass, Esq.

 

©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: The Lady with the Veil (Marie-Suzanne Giroust) (1768). Artist: Alexander Roslin. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm’s website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.comcreate new email with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

R. A. Klass
Your Court Street Lawyer

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