The statements in the complaint must be “sufficiently particular…”

In Buchanan v Law Offices of Sheldon E. Green, P.C., 215 AD3d 793, 795 [2d Dept 2023], the court held:

“To state a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession; and (2) that the attorney’s breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff actual and ascertainable damages” (Dempster v. Liotti, 86 A.D.3d 169, 176, 924 N.Y.S.2d 484 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Joseph v. Fensterman, 204 A.D.3d 766, 770, 167 N.Y.S.3d 106; Katsoris v. Bodnar & Milone, LLP, 186 A.D.3d 1504, 1506, 131 N.Y.S.3d 89; Lopez v. Lozner & Mastropietro, P.C., 166 A.D.3d 871, 873, 88 N.Y.S.3d 554). The statements in the complaint must be “sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense” (CPLR 3013; see Mid–Hudson Val. Fed. Credit Union v. Quartararo & Lois, PLLC, 31 N.Y.3d 1090, 1091, 78 N.Y.S.3d 703, 103 N.E.3d 774). “[B]are legal conclusions” do not suffice, and “[d]ismissal of the complaint is warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery” (Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 137, 141–142, 53 N.Y.S.3d 598, 75 N.E.3d 1159 [internal quotation marks omitted]).


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The court dealt with the claim of attorney’s deceit.

In Philip S. Schwartzman, Inc. v Pliskin, Rubano, Baum & Vitulli, 215 AD3d 699, 702 [2d Dept 2023], the court dealt with the claim of attorney’s deceit, holding, opining:

“Under Judiciary Law § 487(1), an attorney who ‘[i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party’ is liable to the injured party for treble damages” (Altman v. DiPreta, 204 A.D.3d 965, 968, 168 N.Y.S.3d 86). “Since Judiciary Law § 487 authorizes an award of damages only to ‘the party injured,’ an injury to the plaintiff resulting from the alleged deceitful conduct of the defendant attorney is an essential element of a cause of action based on a violation of that statute” (Gumarova v. Law Offs. of Paul A. Boronow, P.C., 129 A.D.3d 911, 911, 12 N.Y.S.3d 187 [internal quotation marks omitted]).


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Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT●ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

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Plaintiff having to prove an attorney-client relationship

In Mid City Elec. Corp. v Peckar & Abramson, 214 AD3d 646, 648 [2d Dept 2023], the court dealt with the issue as to a plaintiff having to prove an attorney-client relationship, holding:

To recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must prove, inter alia, the existence of an attorney-client relationship (see Siemsen v Mevorach, 160 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2018]; Volpe v Canfield, 237 AD2d 282, 283 [1997]). “It is well established that, with respect to attorney malpractice, absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts, or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties, not in privity, for harm caused by professional negligence” (Rovello v Klein, 304 AD2d 638, 638 [2003]). “The unilateral belief of a plaintiff alone does not confer upon him or her the status of a client” (Lombardi v Lombardi, 127 AD3d 1038, 1042 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]).


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Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT●ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

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Statute of limitations began to run when the client demanded and received her file.

In Fraumeni v Law Firm of Jonathan D’Agostino, P.C., 215 AD3d 803 [2d Dept 2023], the court held that the statute of limitations began to run when the client demanded and received her file from the lawyer’s office, holding:

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice, and a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 arising out of the same transactions as the legal malpractice cause of action, is three years (see CPLR 214[6]; Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d 159, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646). “ ‘However, causes of action alleging legal malpractice which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations are timely if the doctrine of continuous representation applies’ ” (Keshner v. Hein Waters & Klein, 185 A.D.3d 808, 808, 125 N.Y.S.3d 582, quoting Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d at 164, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]). “For the doctrine to apply, there must be clear indicia of ‘an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney’ ” (Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d at 164, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646, quoting Aseel v. Jonathan E. Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 A.D.3d 1037, 1038, 966 N.Y.S.2d 202; see Joseph v. Fensterman, 204 A.D.3d at 770, 167 N.Y.S.3d 106). “The essence of a continuous representation toll is the client’s confidence in the attorney’s ability and good faith, such that the client cannot be expected to question and assess the techniques employed or the manner in which the services are rendered” (Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d at 167, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646). Therefore, “[o]ne of the predicates for the application of the doctrine is continuing trust and confidence in the relationship between the parties” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). “ ‘What constitutes a loss of client confidence is fact specific, varying from case to case, but may be demonstrated by relevant documentary evidence involving the parties, or by the client’s actions’ ” (Tantleff v. Kestenbaum & Mark, 131 A.D.3d 955, 957, 15 N.Y.S.3d 840, quoting Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d at 168, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s legal malpractice and Judiciary Law § 487 causes of action were time-barred, as they accrued when the underlying actions were commenced in 2013 and 2015 (see Sclafani v. Kahn, 169 A.D.3d 846, 849, 94 N.Y.S.3d 118; Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d at 167–168, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646). In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the applicable statute of limitations. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the record supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the relationship necessary to invoke the continuous representation doctrine ceased to exist on May 4, 2016, when the plaintiff demanded and received her file from the defendants’ office, thereby indicating her lack of trust and confidence in the parties’ relationship and her intention to discharge the defendants as her attorneys (see Aseel v. Jonathan E Kroll & Assoc., PLLC, 106 A.D.3d at 1038, 966 N.Y.S.2d 202). Moreover, numerous documented communications between the parties submitted by the plaintiff in opposition demonstrated that she lost all trust and confidence in the defendants, such that the attorney-client relationship ceased more than three years before the plaintiff commenced this action (see Sclafani v. Kahn, 169 A.D.3d at 849, 94 N.Y.S.3d 118; Farage v. Ehrenberg, 124 A.D.3d at 160–161, 996 N.Y.S.2d 646).


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Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT●ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

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Partnership Law Section 26 (b) and (c

In Hagans v Dell, 213 AD3d 812, 813-14 [2d Dept 2023], the court affirmed the order denying summary judgment to the attorney, holding:

Dell contends that he is immunized from individual liability under Partnership Law § 26 (b). “Partnership Law § 26 (b) . . . immunizes from individual liability any partner in a partnership registered as a limited liability partnership who did not commit the underlying wrongful act, except to the extent that Partnership Law § 26 (c) imposes liability on that partner where he or she directly supervised the person who committed the wrongful act” (Salazar v Sacco & Fillas, LLP, 114 AD3d 745, 747 [2014]; see Ederer v Gursky, 9 NY3d 514, 523 [2007]). Here, Dell established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the transcript of his deposition testimony and his affidavit demonstrating that he was not involved in handling the plaintiff’s personal injury action and did not supervise the attorney who was responsible.

However, in opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact regarding the extent of Dell’s involvement in her personal injury action. The plaintiff submitted documents showing that attorneys at the law firm had consulted with Dell about strategies in responding to motions and seeking a default judgment. A stipulation of discontinuance as to certain defendants in the personal injury action was signed by Dell. In addition, the record reflects that Dell met with the plaintiff to discuss her case at an initial intake meeting, filled out a client fact sheet, and signed the retainer agreement. Under the circumstances, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Dell was involved in handling the plaintiff’s personal injury action and, as such, was involved in the underlying allegedly wrongful act (see Partnership Law § 26 [c]; Swift Funding, LLC v Isacc, 144 AD3d 471, 472 [2016]).


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Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT●ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

© 2023 Richard A. Klass

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